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The Role of Credit Ratings on Capital Structure and its Speed of Adjustment in  
Bank-Oriented and Market-Oriented Economies  
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this study we examine the role of external corporate credit ratings in explaining 
leverage and the speed of adjustment using an international dataset. We find that the impact of 
credit ratings (CRs) on firms’ capital structures is more significant and negative in countries 
with more market-based (MB) oriented financial systems when quantified by a Financial 
Architecture variable (measuring the size, activity, and efficiency of a stock market compared 
to the banking system of the country annually), but not when measured by the traditional 
division into MB and bank-based (BB) oriented countries. Furthermore, the relation between 
the CRs and firms’ leverage ratios is significantly stronger for companies operating in 
advanced countries than for companies operating in developing economies. Our analysis 
shows that CRs play a more significant role in explaining leverage in the U.S. than in the 
other 18 countries we analyze. We find that companies with poorer CRs display a faster speed 
of adjustment towards a desired level of leverage. This happens regardless of the financial 
orientation or economic development of a country. 
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The Role of Credit Ratings on Capital Structure and its Speed of Adjustment in  
Bank-Oriented and Market-Oriented Economies 
 
1. Introduction 
By changing a security’s or borrower’s credit rating (hereafter CR), an external credit rating 
agency (hereafter CRA) sends a signal to investors about this security’s or borrower’s altered 
creditworthiness, which in turn affects the investors’ required rate of return (SEC, 2011). Thus, CRs 
influence issuers’ access to and cost of funds. Moreover, higher CRs improve the marketability of the 
securities issued, partially due to restrictions imposed on many institutional investors that 
prohibit them from purchasing speculative-grade offerings. Due to their regulatory importance 
and de facto oligopoly in the credit rating industry, The Big Three CRAs: Standard & Poor’s 
Ratings Services (S&P), Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s), and Fitch Ratings, Ltd. (Fitch) 
have a strong influence on firms’ and countries’ fund-raising abilities and costs. Consequently, 
they potentially have an immense power over the capital markets worldwide.  
The recent capital structure literature highlights both the regulatory and information 
function of CRs that forces the managers to consider their firms’ CRs as one of the most 
important factors when making financing decisions (e.g., Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; Brounen 
et al., 2004; Graham and Harvey, 2001). Deb et al. (2011) argue that “hardwiring of ratings is 
now so pervasive that market participants could not ignore them even if they did not consider 
them reliable” (p.3). However, the extensive use of CRs in regulation, investment process, 
and financial contracts may lead to a common misperception that the ratings issued by CRAs 
are to some extent “official”, and therefore triggering an overreliance on CRs. This can lead to 
the crowding out of private information gathering. 
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Our paper seeks to extend existing research by focusing on the role of credit ratings on 
leverage and by examining differences in the relationship across countries. We make a 
number of contributions to the literature. First, papers that include CRs among the 
determinants of capital structure are conducted with respect to samples of U.S. companies 
(Byoun, 2011; Faulkender et al., 2012; Kisgen, 2006, 2009) but, to the best of our knowledge, 
there has been no such study undertaken with respect to other economies. This seems 
surprising given the documented importance of CRs on financing decisions (at least in the 
U.S.) and the global presence of the CRAs and their services
1
. Moreover, the existing U.S. 
literature gives mixed results. For example, Kisgen (2009), and Tang (2009) argue that the 
higher the CRs, the higher the firm’s leverage ratio while evidence for a negative effect comes 
from studies by Byoun (2011), Frank and Goyal (2009), and Leary and Roberts (2005). In our 
study we hope to extend the literature by including a set of variables capturing the impact of 
CRs on firms’ leverage in 19 countries that have different financial orientations and economic 
development.  
Second, despite the rapidly growing literature on dynamic capital structure there are only 
two studies (Faulkender et al., 2012; Kisgen, 2009) that examine the influence of CRs on the 
speed with which firms rebalance their debt ratios towards target levels. Both of these studies 
use U.S. data. Kisgen (2009) focuses on CR changes and examines whether firms have 
minimum target ratings along with optimum gearing ratios. He finds that rating downgrades 
carry additional substantial costs that are higher than the costs associated with the adjustment 
towards a desired leverage ratio which in turn makes firms adjust faster. However, in the case 
                                                     
1
 According to Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007), in 2003 at least one private CRA was present in 71 out of 
129 countries examined in their study. In addition, they find a strong, positive relation between the existence of a 
CRA and the level of private credit to GDP.  
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of an upgrade he finds no significant change in companies’ speed of adjustment (hereafter 
SOA). Faulkender et al. (2012) compare the SOAs of rated and non-rated companies and 
argue that when firms are over- (under-) levered, and have bond CRs, they adjust substantially 
slower (faster) than non-rated firms. They assert that having a CR can “affect leverage 
adjustment speeds so greatly that they can reverse the usual finding (…) that under-levered 
firms adjust less rapidly than over-levered firms” (p.643). We add to these two studies by 
investigating the impact of different-grade CRs on the SOAs of companies operating in the 
U.S. and 18 other countries. Our results suggest that regardless of a financial system’s 
orientation or the economic development of a country, firms with poorer CRs have faster 
SOAs. This evidence might be explained by the different degrees of financial constraints 
(Byoun, 2011; Faulkender et al., 2012) experienced by firms with different CRs. 
Third, prior international capital structure research has classified countries into those that 
are bank based (BB) and market based (MB), a distinction that depends on the relative sizes of 
the banking and equity markets within a country. Conventional thinking is that corporate 
leverage will be higher in BB countries and that the creditworthiness of a firm is assessed by 
the bank without much need for an externally provided CR. Thus, the financial orientation of a 
country can influence the magnitude of a CR’s impact on debt-equity ratios. However, the 
results from empirical studies provide mixed findings on the relation between BB/MB and 
capital structures. For example, Borio (1990) and Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008) report 
that German companies (a BB economy) as being more highly geared than Canadian firms (a 
MB economy) while Rajan and Zingales (1995) find evidence for the opposite. This has led to 
questions about the efficacy of the traditional categorization of BB and MB countries. Rajan 
and Zingales (2003) report that in the last two decades of the 20
th
 century, the stock markets in 
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many countries regarded as BB expanded more than 13 times in terms of market capitalization 
and equity financing grew more than 16 times whereas during the same period the 
corresponding growth in the U.S. and the U.K. were approximately four-fold. Thus the 
traditional breakdown of countries into BB and MB might be too simplistic in today’s world. 
In light of this, we adopt an alternative way of capturing the orientation of country’s financial 
system by using the Financial Architecture (FINARCH) variable developed and used by Čihák 
et al. (2012), Levine (2002), and Tadesse (2006) (see Section 2.2 and Appendix B for more 
detailed explanations of FINARCH). We find that except for Japan, the impact of CRs on a 
capital structure is more significant in more market-oriented financial systems (measured by 
the FINARCH variable), whereas the simple MB/BB division of countries, has no significant 
influence on the CR effect. 
The rest of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
related literature. In section 3, we develop hypotheses, econometric models and elaborate on 
variables and data used. All the results and their implications are described in section 4. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Theories of Capital Structure 
We can distinguish among 3 major strands of capital structure studies: the Trade-off 
Theory (TOT), the Pecking Order theory (POT), and market timing. The TOT (Kraus and 
Litzenberger, 1973) states that the firms’ capital structure is chosen based on the idea of 
achieving an optimal level of leverage. This value-maximising debt ratio is achieved by 
balancing the costs and benefits of debt financing. On the one hand, we have the advantages 
of leverage such as the reduction of corporate tax. On the other hand, firms incur the costs of 
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financial distress both direct and indirect (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) and various agency 
costs (e.g., Jensen, 1986). According to the POT developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
Myers (1984), companies do not aim at any specific debt-equity ratio. Due to the asymmetric 
information between managers and investors, firms usually underprice share issues. Hence, to 
minimise the adverse selection problem, firms give preference to internal financing over debt 
and to debt over equity when raising funds for investment. Moreover, in the POT, companies 
have no target debt ratios. The market timing theory also eschews the idea of an optimal 
capital structure. Instead, management is more prone to issue equity when stock prices are 
high and to repurchase equity when stock prices are low (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Thus, 
firms try to minimize the cost of financing by timing the market. 
Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) attempt to reconcile the TOT and the POT using 
dynamic modelling where firms follow the POT in the short run and the TOT in the long run. 
Whenever the adjustment costs of rebalancing towards the optimal level of leverage outweigh 
the cost of being outside of the aforementioned optimum, the managers will allow their firm’s 
leverage to divert temporarily from it and make the adjustments only occasionally. Using 
partial-adjustment models, Huang and Ritter (2009), Leary and Roberts (2005), and Lemmon, 
Roberts and Zender (2008) document that firms rebalance their debt ratios with various 
SOAs.  
Recently, a number of studies have undertaken an international comparison of SOAs and 
document that the speeds with which firms converge towards their target leverage levels vary 
substantially (e.g., Antoniou et al., 2008; González and González, 2008). Öztekin and 
Flannery (2012) argue that an economy’s legal and financial institutions significantly 
influence the SOAs due to distinct costs and/or benefits associated with the adjustment 
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process. Furthermore, they document that on average firms based in MB countries display 
much faster SOAs as compared with companies based in BB countries (annually by 19% and 
3%, respectively). They argue that their results “suggest that a market-based structure 
imposes lower costs of adjusting or higher benefits of converging to a firm’s optimal capital 
ratio, or both” (p.103). 
2.2 Countries’ Financial Orientations 
Conventional thinking is that in bank based financial systems, banks provide most of the 
capital for firms while in market based systems firms can raise funds in capital markets 
(Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2000).  Here, a BB country is characterized by its banking 
system being relatively more developed as compared to the stock market. The opposite is the 
case for the MB economies where stock markets are larger and more liquid (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 2002). Existing research traditionally focuses on 4 countries; Japan and 
Germany are considered as a benchmark for the BB economies, whereas the U.S. and the U.K. 
are considered as the benchmark for the MB economies (e.g., Antoniou et al., 2008). 
Due to diverse research findings and a rapid development of stock markets in many of the 
BB countries during last 3 decades (Rajan and Zingales, 2003), many scholars criticize the 
traditional differentiation between BB or MB economies as being inaccurate or inappropriate 
(e.g., Tadesse, 2006). We use an alternative way of capturing the orientation of country’s 
financial system by using the FINARCH variable developed and used by Čihák et al. (2012), 
Levine (2002), and Tadesse (2006). In a nutshell, the FINARCH variable is an index of the 
degree of stock market orientation in a country. This index is formed by taking the first 
principal component of 3 other indices measuring the size, activity, and efficiency of a stock 
market compared to the banking system of an economy. A more MB-oriented financial system 
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(represented by higher values of the FINARCH variable) should make equity financing 
cheaper and more easily available for the companies.  
2.3 Capital Structure and Credit Ratings 
CRAs provide information about financial instruments and their issuers in the form of 
CRs corresponding to the assessed creditworthiness of the issuing body. Consequently, CRs 
can be seen as a proxy for the probability of firms’ defaults. Thus, they enable investors to 
value the financial instruments and set the required yield on them according to their default 
risk.  
Graham and Harvey (2001), through a survey carried out on U.S. firms’ CFOs, document 
that a CR is the second most important factor (and nearly on the par with financial flexibility) 
when making financing decisions. Bancel and Mittoo (2004) find an even stronger importance 
of CRs from a survey of European companies’ managers. Leary and Roberts (2005) divide 
their sample into two portfolios: companies with above and below speculative-grade CRs. 
Their results show a negative association between the investment grade CRs and a debt 
issuance. Kisgen (2006) developed his Credit Rating-Capital Structure (CR-CS) Hypothesis. 
He argues that companies expecting changes in their CRs tend to issue equity instead of bonds 
in order to avoid the extra costs of a downgrade or to later capitalize from an upgrade. Frank 
and Goyal (2009) observe a significant and positive (negative) impact on the total debt to 
book (market) assets ratios if a firm has a debt with an investment-grade rating. Tang (2009) 
shows that firms with an enhancement in CRs gain better access to the credit market. Hence, 
they react by increasing debt financing relative to equity financing. Kisgen (2009) documents 
a positive relation between the CRs and firms’ gearing levels. In addition, his results show 
that downgraded firms adjust significantly faster towards their target levels of gearing. Byoun 
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(2011), in accordance with his Financial Flexibility Hypothesis (FFH), finds evidence of an 
inverted-U shaped association between leverage and CRs
2
. Faulkender et al. (2012) use bond 
ratings to distinguish between financially constrained (without bond CRs) and unconstrained 
companies (with bond CRs). They find that over- (under-) levered companies with debt CRs 
adjust substantially slower (quicker) than non-rated firms. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Hypotheses development 
Traditionally in BB oriented countries the banking industry supplies the majority of credit 
to firms (Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2000). Ties between companies and the banking sector, 
such as loan commitments are stronger than in the MB oriented countries. Due to the close 
long-term relation between lenders and the borrowing firms, banks enjoy the advantages of 
inside monitoring. This in turn decreases the information asymmetry and allows banks to 
assess the creditworthiness of a borrower using either their own internal credit ratings or some 
other credit scoring systems, without a need for external CRs. Companies that operate in the 
countries regarded as MB do not have such a close relationship with banks and may suffer 
from a greater degree of information asymmetry. The individual or institutional lenders cannot 
assess the quality of borrowing firms and their investments. A CRA can bridge this gap by 
providing CRs. This leads us to our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The effect of a credit rating on a firm’s capital structure is more significant in 
MB than in BB countries. 
 
Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999) point out, that in the developing economies there are not 
enough external CRs and their quality is poor due to their short history. In addition, in 
                                                     
2
 He argues that due to the different stage of a firm’s development, there is a negative relation between the CRs 
and gearing ratios, but non-rated companies have lower debt-equity ratios than rated firms. 
9 
 
developing countries there is a strong causal relation between sovereign and firms’ CRs 
documented by recent studies (e.g., Williams, Alsakka and Gwilym, 2013). Therefore, 
frequent historical downgrades and volatility for sovereign ratings of developing economies 
often regarded as excessive (Ferri et al., 1999), lead to increased volatility of firms’ CRs. Due 
to these factors, the information role of CRs in the process of issuing equity (Frank and Goyal, 
2009; Liu and Malatesta, 2005) or debt (Tang, 2009) loses importance. In other words, capital 
market investors from developing countries do not attach as much weight to the CRs as their 
peers from advanced countries. Moreover, there is ample evidence indicating that the more 
economically developed is a country, the more important become stock and bond markets 
relative to banks (Boot and Thakor, 2000; Song and Thakor, 2010). Consequently, in 
developing countries firms finance a larger share of their investment needs with various forms 
of bank lending. Thus, a weaker effect of CRs on a capital structure is expected. This leads to 
our second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of a credit rating on a firm’s capital structure in developing 
economies is less significant than in advanced economies. 
 
According to the TOT, the positive role of better CRs on the availability of debt at a 
lower price should result in easier and cheaper access to the credit market. de Jong, Kabir and 
Nguyen (2008) argue that in a country with a more developed bond market, firms enjoy more 
alternatives when borrowing funds, and lenders are more ready to provide financing. Thus, 
the importance of CRs as a signaling tool for borrowers should increase with the level of 
credit market development. This leads to our third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: A credit rating has a more positive effect (or a less negative effect) on a firms’ 
capital structure in economies with more developed bond markets. 
 
Due to diverse results in the literature (Antoniou et al., 2008; Borio, 1990; Rajan and 
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Zingales, 1995) and a rapid development of stock markets in a number of traditional BB 
countries during the last 3 decades (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2009; Rajan and Zingales, 
2003), many scholars criticize the traditional MB/BB differentiation between economies as 
obsolete and inaccurate. The FINARCH variable we develop in this study measures a 
country’s financial system orientation, its annual fluctuations, and is an additional and 
alternative proxy to the traditional BB and MB breakdown. We expect that the higher the 
value of FINARCH (indicating a more market-oriented financial orientation), the more 
significant the effect of CRs on the firm’s capital structure. This yields our fourth hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: The effect of a credit rating on a firm’s capital structure is more significant in 
countries with a more market-oriented financial architecture. 
 
The existing literature shows that a firm’s SOA towards its target level of gearing 
depends on the costs and benefits
3
 stemming from such an adjustment (e.g., Öztekin and 
Flannery, 2012). Faulkender et al. (2012) document that the SOA is substantially different for 
under- and over-levered companies (29.8% and 56.4%, respectively). In addition, they argue 
that when firms are over- (under-) levered, and have a CR, they adjust significantly more 
slowly (more quickly) than non-rated firms. They argue that this is associated with the various 
degrees of financial constraints faced by the two types of companies due to the different eases 
of access to financial markets and the costs of doing so for rated (less constrained) and 
non-rated firms (more constrained). They conclude that having a CR is so important that it 
can reverse the findings of faster (slower) SOAs for over- (under-) levered companies. 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) document that financially unconstrained firms are more likely to 
                                                     
3
 An example of adjustment costs are transaction costs of issuing/repurchasing debt and equity incurred by a 
firm when it converges to its desired gearing ratio, which can impede the realization of target capital structure 
and cause a company to divert from its optimal leverage periodically (e.g., Flannery and Rangan, 2006). 
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deviate from their target gearing ratio in an attempt to time the markets by 
issuing/repurchasing securities when macroeconomic conditions are most favorable. 
According to Byoun (2011), firms with low CRs have insufficient internal funds and therefore 
are forced to engage in capital market transactions in order to fund their investments. This in 
turn enables them to adjust their debt ratios at relatively low marginal cost
4
. On the other hand, 
companies with high CRs only rarely tap capital markets due to internal funds being large 
enough to pay for their investments. In other words, the adjustment of their capital structure 
would require firms to make an additional “trip” to either the stock or the bond market, thus 
incurring extra costs. His findings are confirmed by Faulkender et al. (2012). Our fifth 
hypothesis follows. 
Hypothesis 5: Firms with high credit ratings (less financially constrained) adjust towards 
their optimal debt-equity ratios at a slower speed than firms with poor credit ratings (more 
financially constrained). 
 
3.2 Data Sources 
Due to the limited availability of S&P’s long-term domestic issuer CRs in developing 
countries, the final sample includes just 19 economies. In doing so, we eliminate countries 
with less than 7 rated firms in the period of study. Appendix A lists the sample countries and 
classifies them as MB or BB, and as economically advanced or developing.  
The whole sample is an unbalanced panel of 17,046 annual observations
 
(Appendix A 
gives the number of firms and annual observations for each country). Each firm is represented 
by at least 3 consecutive annual observations
5
 in the sample, for which it is rated by S&P, 
listed on a major stock exchange of the sample countries and has no missing variables. All 
                                                     
4
 While conducting capital market transactions in order to raise funds (by issuing debt or equity), a company can 
simultaneously converge towards its target debt ratio without incurring a significant additional cost. 
5
 A minimum of 3 consecutive annual observations are required to conduct the Generalized Method of Moments 
procedure (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
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firms have leverage ratios less than 1 (Huang and Ritter, 2009), and market-to-book ratios 
between zero and 10 (Leary and Roberts, 2005). To diminish the influence of outliers, all 
firm-specific factors are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile (Faulkender et al., 2012). In 
addition, all financial companies (SIC codes 6000-6999) are removed from the sample as the 
nature of financial firms’ liabilities are significantly different from those of non-financial 
entities. The annual observations are defined based on the fiscal year-ends (Flannery and 
Rangan, 2006) and the final sample covers a period of 20 years (1991 to 2010)
6
.  
Apart from the separate regressions with respect to both financial orientation and 
economic development of countries, we also conduct an individual analysis for both the U.S. 
and Japan. The reason for doing so is twofold. First, the pivotal economic importance of both 
countries and their financial markets for the global economy (stock and bond markets alike) 
requires particular attention. Second, due to the limited S&P’s issuer CRs, there is a huge 
disparity in the numbers of total country observations between some of the economies. For 
example, Thai, Indian, Japanese, and American companies represent about 0.46%, 0.53%, 
15.86%, and 59.75% of the total sample firms, respectively. This can create an 
“over-representation bias” in the regression analysis by the economies with the most 
observations.  
3.3 Explanations of Variables 
As a benchmark dependent variable we use long-term leverage to the market value of 
total assets ratio (MLLEV). Market leverage is mostly used in the relevant research (see 
Antoniou et al., 2008; Leary and Roberts, 2005). Welch (2004) points out the theories of 
                                                     
6
 In case of the developing economies, due to poor CR coverage, the sample covers 17 years (1994-2010). For 
the BB sample of firms (excluding Japanese) the sample starts in 1992. 
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target ratios are implicitly about market gearing. de Jong et al. (2008) argue that including 
short-term debt into an analysis would create problems in interpreting results (due to a trade 
credit being a major component of the short-term debt). In line with prior studies (de Jong et 
al., 2008; Öztekin and Flannery, 2012), 3 additional measures of a firm’s leverage ratio are 
used as a robustness check: total leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLEV), 
long-term leverage to the book value of total assets ratio (BLLEV), and total leverage to the 
book value of total assets ratio (BLEV).  In their recent paper, Frank and Goyal (2009) 
identify 6 core determinants for the market leverage ratio. In our study we use all these 6 
factors: profitability (EBIT/TA), growth opportunities (MTB), relative tangible assets 
(TANG/TA), firm size (SIZE), median industry leverage (MEDLEV)
7
, and annual inflation rate 
(INFL). Appendix B lists all the variables, their definitions and data sources and Appendix C 
summarizes the expected relations between the leverage ratio and various determinants. 
We measure the CR variable (RATING) by coding all S&P’s long-term domestic issuer 
CRs letter grades in terms of 22 ordinal numerical values (from 1 to 22)
8
. In a relation 
between firms’ CRs and gearing ratios, two sources of endogeneity occur: unobservable 
heterogeneity and simultaneity (for a more detailed explanation see section 3.6). In order to 
reduce the possibility of endogeneity and in line with the relevant literature (e.g., Kisgen, 
2009), we use the CRs lagged one year (RATINGL1) as compared with the remaining 
variables. Appendix D summarizes the whole spectrum of the CRs used by S&P along with 
the corresponding coding system. 
                                                     
7
 Following the approach of de Jong et al. (2008), we group firms into 12 broad categories based on the U.S. 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). 
8
 Where AAA = 22, AA+ = 21, AA = 20, AA- = 19, A+ = 18, A = 17, A- = 16, BBB+ = 15, BBB = 14, BBB- = 
13, BB+ = 12, BB = 11, BB- = 10, B+ = 9, B = 8, B- = 7, CCC+ = 6, CCC = 5, CCC- = 4, CC = 3, SD = 2, and 
D = 1. This numerical procedure is similar to that used in prior research (e.g., Gande and Parsley, 2005). 
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In addition, we include 7 CR-related variables (RATINGL1*FINARCH, 
RATINGL1*MBDUM, RATINGL1*DEVDUM, RATINGL1*BOND, RATINGL1*US, 
RATINGL1*JAPAN, and RATINGL1*LAGLEV). These interaction variables incorporate the 
first lag of the CR variable (RATINGL1) in order to minimize a threat of CRs’ intrinsic 
endogeneity. The interaction terms are used to test Hypotheses 1 to 5.  
To capture a country’s financial orientation in line with the traditional approach we 
introduce a dummy variable (MBDUM)
9
. Due to the mixed results in existing research and the 
questionable validity of the crude MB/BB division of countries we use an additional and 
alternative variable, which we call FINARCH. The higher is the value of FINARCH, the more 
market-oriented is the financial system of a country (Levine, 2002; Tadesse, 2006). This 
variable is measured annually, therefore, it captures the different paces of the overall 
development of stock markets across and within countries. Another dummy variable 
(DEVDUM) differentiates between advanced and developing economies according to the 
classification proposed by the IMF (2012)
10
. BOND is a proxy for the importance of bond 
markets defined as the sum of public and private bond market capitalization over GDP (de 
Jong et al., 2008). We expect that there exists a positive relation between the BOND variable 
and firms’ leverage ratio, since the more developed the market, the more ways for companies 
to borrow.  
3.4 The Autoregressive Model 
                                                     
9
 MBDUM is equal to one when a company operates in a MB environment (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, 
Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the U.K, and the U.S.), and equals zero 
otherwise (France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Russia, and Spain). 
10
 The variable DEVDUM is equal to one when an entity resides in an advanced country (Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and 
the U.S.), and is equal to zero otherwise (India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Thailand). 
15 
 
Antoniou et al. (2008) argue that in order to obtain a valid dynamic model, which takes 
into account the possibility of the autoregressive (AR) process on an error term and the 
influence of adjustment costs on a firm’s SOA towards its target level of gearing, a one-period 
lagged dependent variable is required. Such an autoregressive model is specified below. 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) + ∑ 𝜑𝑘
11
𝑘=1 𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜐𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
Where (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡) stands for the leverage ratio for firm i in year t, (α0) is a constant 
term, (𝛼1) and (𝜑𝑘) are the coefficients of the parameters to estimate. (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)) 
is the first lag of the dependent variable (to capture the dynamic aspect of capital structure). 
(X) is a vector of explanatory variables composed of k-factors (k = 1,…, 11).  
Term (𝜇𝑖) represents the time-invariant unobserved firm fixed effects (reputation or 
management performance) that influences firms’ capital structures. Term (𝜐𝑡) represents the 
time-specific shocks, which can fluctuate over time and affect all the firms in one or more 
countries (e.g., demand shocks). The error term (𝜀𝑖𝑡) has a mean equal to zero, constant 
variance σ2, and does not suffer from serial correlation. 
3.5 The Dynamic Model 
The traditional dynamic approach tests for the presence of an optimal debt-equity ratio, 
and how fast firms rebalance towards it. The annual changes between years t and t-1 in the 
leverage ratios of company i (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 - 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)) partly absorb the gap between its 
lagged leverage in year t-1 and the optimal leverage of the firm i in year t (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡*). 
Assuming that this optimal gearing ratio is also a function of k determinants from equation (1), 
then: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡* = ∑ 𝛹
11
𝑘=1 kXkit + ωit      (2) 
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Where (𝛹ks) are coefficient estimates, which are the same for all companies, (X) is a 
vector of k-determinants and (ωit) is a serially correlated error term suspected of 
heteroskedasticity, and with a mean equal to zero. Whenever the adjustment costs of 
rebalancing towards the optimal level of leverage outweigh the cost of being outside of the 
aforementioned optimum, the managers will allow their firm’s leverage to divert temporarily 
from it. Equation (3) shows how firms adjust towards their desired debt levels. 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 - 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) = α (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡* - 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1))  (3) 
Where the adjustment coefficient (α) takes any value between zero and 1 and represents 
the transaction costs that obstruct the full adjustment towards a firm’s optimal leverage 
(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡*). There is an inverse relation between (α) and the adjustment costs
11
. Equation 
(3) after simple rearrangements of terms can be rewritten as equation (4). 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡= α𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡* + (1 – α)𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)      (4) 
Substituting equation (2) into (4), we get: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = (1 – α)𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) + ∑ 𝛼𝛹
11
𝑘=1 kXkit + αωit    (5) 
Where again α measures a firm’s SOA.  
3.6 Endogeneity Problem and Biased SOA Using The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 
The Within Groups Method (Fixed Effects) 
In a relation between CRs and capital structure, two sources of endogeneity take place: 
unobservable heterogeneity and simultaneity
12
. It can be argued that some unobservable 
determinants (e.g., a company’s reputation or management performance) affect both a 
                                                     
11
 If (α) equals one (no transaction costs), a firm’s current debt ratio and its target ratio are equal: (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  
= 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡*). If (α) equals zero, no adjustment occurs.  
12
 The former phenomenon occurs when some unobservable factors cause a change in both the dependent and 
independent variables. The simultaneity arises when the explanatory variable is affected by the dependent 
variable or its lags. 
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company’s capital structure and a CR (Kisgen, 2009). As a CR improves, the firm’s costs of 
debt financing are lower, and thus the managers could borrow more cheaply and increase its 
leverage, which in turn could cause a CR downgrade
13
. One approach used to reduce the 
endogeneity is to use the first lag of the CR. However, this does not guarantee that the 
endogeneity problem will be solved. It has been empirically proven that in the case of firms’ 
capital structures, estimation results for the SOA obtained from either the OLS or the Within 
Groups approach are highly biased and inconsistent
14
. The lagged leverage’s coefficient (and 
the SOA
15
) is inflated (deflated) in the OLS models, whereas it is deflated (inflated) when 
using the Within Groups model. 
3.7 The Difference Generalized Method of Moments 
Wintoki et al. (2012) argue that the Difference Generalized Method of Moments (hereafter 
GMM) (Arellano and Bond, 1991) successfully accounts for the dynamic nature of the 
dependent variable, while accounting for endogeneity. In this approach, we take the generic 
dynamic equation (5) and rewrite it in the first-differenced (hereafter transformed) form such 
that: 
Δ𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = (1 – α)Δ𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) + ∑ 𝛼𝛹
11
𝑘=1 kΔXkit + αΔωit   (6)  
Where Δs represent first differences. This transformed equation handles the unobserved 
heterogeneity by eliminating firm fixed effects (𝜇𝑖). However, the differenced lagged 
dependent variable Δ𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) is still correlated with the differenced error term Δωit. 
Thus, like in the Within Groups models, the estimated SOA is inflated and the bias declines 
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 This suggests a simultaneity problem and thus the Within Groups method would yield biased, possibly even 
spurious and yet statistically significant results (Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2012). 
14
 However, in case of the Within Groups method the bias declines with panel length and results become 
consistent as the sample period approaches infinity (Lemmon et al., 2008). 
15
 A firm’s SOA is obtained by subtracting the coefficient on lagged leverage ratio from 1. 
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with panel length (short panel bias). 
By first-differencing equation (5) into equation (6), we obtain valid instrumental 
variables (hereafter IVs). Under the assumption of no second-order serial correlation in 
residuals ωit, the moment (orthogonal) conditions exist between the Δωit and the 
dependent/independent variables lagged two or more periods. Thus, the lagged values of 
regressors are valid IVs for their first differences from equation (6) (Huang and Ritter, 2009). 
Nevertheless, the Difference GMM technique suffers from a number of shortcomings 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Most importantly, it suffers from a 
significant sample bias when the autoregressive lagged leverage parameter is highly persistent, 
i.e., close to 1 (Antoniou et al., 2008). 
3.8 The System Generalized Method of Moments 
Previous research suggests that the system GMM developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998) can deal with the problems encountered when using OLS, 
Within Groups, and the Difference GMM. Apart from the lagged values of variables used as 
instruments for their first differences from equation (6), the System GMM utilizes the lagged 
first differences as IVs for the regressors from a non-transformed equation (5). Therefore, we 
have a system of two equations. In our research we use a Two-Step System GMM procedure 
with orthogonal deviations (we use the “xtabond2” program written by David Roodman for 
STATA users). Antoniou et al. (2008) argue for the superiority of the Two-Step System GMM 
over the One-Step System in the case of dynamic modeling. Flannery and Hankins (2013) 
state that for unbalanced panels of data, the Two-Step System GMM developed by Blundell 
and Bond (1998) “remains the best option for higher levels of endogeneity if the lagged 
dependent variable is of interest.” (p.13). However, the Two-Step System GMM methodology 
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tends to proliferate the number of IVs
16
. To control for instrument proliferation the number of 
IVs should be kept below the number of firms (Roodman, 2006, 2008). In order to do so, we 
can either use a “certain” limited number of lags17, apply collapsing instruments (Roodman, 
2008), or both when necessary. 
4. Discussion of the Results 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 shows that most of the variables differ statistically in terms of their mean and 
median values across different groups of countries. This lends support to the claim that the 
financial systems and economic environments have an impact on firms’ financial 
characteristics. Panel A shows that 2 out of 4 measures of leverage ratios are significantly 
lower for firms operating in MB countries, one significantly higher and one roughly the same 
as in BB countries. These mixed results dull the distinction between the traditionally defined 
MB and BB economies with regards to firms’ indebtedness. In line with recent studies (Fan, 
Titman and Twite, 2012), Panel B indicates that firms operating in developing markets display 
higher debt-to-equity ratios than their counterparts from advanced economies. From Panel C, 
it is clear that in 3 cases, the leverage ratios of companies based in the U.S. are significantly 
higher. These results go against the view that firms based in a BB environment (e.g., Japan) 
are more highly geared. Recent studies report roughly equal leverage ratios for American and 
Japanese firms (Öztekin and Flannery, 2012) or even substantially lower for Japanese 
companies (e.g., de Jong et al., 2008). Moreover, untabulated line charts of debt ratios’ annual 
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 Roodman (2008) points out that if there are too many IVs, invalid results appear to be valid. In other words, a 
large number of instruments would overfit the instrumented regressors and bias their estimated coefficients. In 
addition, a Hansen J-test of over-identification would be weakened, yielding implausibly high p-values equal 1. 
17
 This number is always kept below the maximum number of lags and varies depending on the time dimension 
and number of firms in the samples. 
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mean values indicate an increasing (decreasing) trend for American (Japanese) sample of 
firms. Nishioka and Baba (2004) point out that since the late 1990s, Japanese companies have 
been reducing their debt ratios in order to regain their creditworthiness and/or due to lack of 
investment opportunities. 
[Table 1 here] 
Figure 1 reports yearly plots of median FINARCH values for the different samples. We 
conclude that falling leverage ratios in the Japanese market coincide with a relatively faster 
rise in values of the FINARCH variable. In 2003, the degree of MB orientation of Japanese 
financial system (proxied by the FINARCH) caught up with that of the U.S. 
[Figure 1 here] 
In the case of CRs, the MB sample of firms enjoys higher credit ratings of approximately 
0.6 and 1 notch (in terms of both mean and median values, respectively) than the firms from 
BB countries. See Table 1, Panel A.  The comparison of standard deviations indicates greater 
variation in CRs issued for companies operating in a BB environment. As shown in Table 1, 
Panel B, CRs are fewer and lower in the developing countries as compared with their 
advanced peers (the difference of roughly 3.5 and 4 notches for means and medians). Despite 
the maximum CR in the developing country sample being 5 notches lower, the standard 
deviation of CRs in this sample (3.185) is higher than that of the advanced country sample 
(3.074)
18
. Table 1, Panel C, shows that the Japanese sample has an average and median CR 2 
notches better than in the U.S. sample. 
Correlation analysis (not reported but available on request) indicates a negative and 
statistically significant association between CRs and debt ratios in all samples, in line with the 
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 This evidence suggests considerably greater variability of CRs in developing economies. 
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POT. Table 2 presents mean values of the dependent variables (MLLEV, MLEV, BLLEV, and 
BLEV) and firm-specific determinants by different CRs. Figure 2 shows plots of the 
dependent variables’ means (MLLEV) by different CRs. The average values of debt-to-equity 
ratios and their plots indicate that the least leveraged firms are those with the highest CRs. 
Moreover, for all of Table 2’s Panels, as the ratings increase, so do firms’ profitability, their 
growth opportunities, size and relative tangible assets. 
[Figure 2 here] 
[Table 2 here] 
 
4.2 The Determinants of the Firm Leverage Ratio 
In order to test for Hypotheses 1 and 2, we use 3 methodologies: OLS, Within Groups, 
and Two-Step System GMM. However, our main conclusions draw from the Two-Step 
System GMM as this controls for endogeneity. Estimates from OLS and within Groups are 
used as robustness results. LAGLEV coefficients in Table 3 (obtained from Two-Step System 
GMM) are in between those from OLS and Within Groups (closer to those from Within 
Groups Effects)
19
, which is where they should be (Roodman, 2006). Moreover, the m1, m2, 
and the Hansen tests
20
 indicate that Two-Step System GMM is correctly specified for all 
samples. Table 3 indicates positive and statistically significant coefficients for LAGLEV
21
 
regardless of country’s financial orientation and economic development. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Flannery and Rangan (2006), González and González (2008), 
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 In the interest of brevity, the results obtained from the OLS and Within Groups are not shown here but are 
available on request. 
20
 The tests for the first (m1) and second (m2) order correlations test the null hypotheses of no first or second 
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, respectively. The Hansen test of over-identification tests 
the null hypothesis of the validity of instrumental variables used in the model. 
21
 In accordance with the recent studies, the results are based on long-term leverage to the market value of total 
assets ratio (MLLEV). All estimates were also conducted using 3 alternative proxies for leverage ratios (available 
on request). 
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and others. The coefficients are between zero and 1 which is consistent with leverage 
converging to desired levels (Antoniou et al., 2008). 
[Table 3 here] 
The explanatory power of the estimated models falls dramatically after exclusion of the 
LAGLEV from analyses. The coefficients on the lagged leverage ratio in columns 1, 2, and 4 
indicate roughly equal and rapid SOAs. For example, the coefficient from column 2 (0.6402) 
implies that on average rated firms based in the MB countries close 36% (1- 0.6402) of the 
gap between their actual and target gearing within one year. At this speed it takes about 18 
months
22
 to close half the gap between current and target levels of debt. Likewise, firms 
based in the BB countries converge towards their desired leverage by 32% a year. Japanese 
firms adjust at a more sluggish pace as compared with their American counterparts. This 
evidence indicates that firms in the MB environment are characterized by lower costs of 
adjustment or larger benefits of convergence towards the optimum gearing ratio (or both) than 
firms in the BB environment
23
. Similar to the results in Flannery and Rangan (2006) and 
González and González (2008), our estimates suggest that in all samples, the target market 
debt ratios are of pivotal importance for companies. 
The results from the developing country sample indicate that firms adjust towards their 
target capital structure at a faster speed (roughly 48% annually) than firms operating in 
advanced countries (about 36% annually). The rapid SOAs in developing economies are in 
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 This calculation is simply ln(0.5)/ln(1- 0.3598) (e.g., Öztekin and Flannery, 2012). 
23
 Antoniou et al. (2008) document similar divergence in the SOAs and argue that because of the stronger ties 
and close long-term relations between companies and creditors (banks) in BB economies, the costs of being 
away from the optimum capital structure are lower than the costs of adjustment. Therefore, firms can adjust 
slowly towards their desired level of leverage. Moreover, unlike their peers from MB countries, firms in BB 
countries depend less on the signaling mechanism of debt to manifest their quality to investors in equity or bond 
markets. 
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line with the those reported by González and González (2008), who document very fast SOAs 
(approximately 50% and above).  
Additional support for a partial adjustment models and the importance of target debt 
ratios on firms’ capital structure policies is presented in Appendix E. In it we summarize the 
annual SOA estimates of firms
24
 separately for each country. The estimated SOAs are 
positive in all samples and statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level in 15 countries.  
4.3 Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 
From Table 3, one can conclude that the results for the CR variable are robust
25
 and 
confirm Hypotheses 1 and 2. There is a negative and statistically significant relation between 
CRs and firms’ debt-equity ratios for the overall, MB, advanced, and the U.S. panels. For the 
U.S. sample, the coefficient on RATINGL1 is -0.0037. This means that a CR upgrade (or 
downgrade) by 4 notches (e.g., from A to AA+ or vice versa) in year t will lead to an 
approximate drop (or rise) of 1.5% in a company’s debt-to-equity ratio in year t+1, all else 
equal. This evidence is consistent with the negative and significant correlations described 
earlier. Negative and statistically significant coefficients on RATINGL1 inform that on the one 
hand, higher CRs make firms more transparent in the eyes of investors. This in turn leads to 
lower information asymmetry and adverse selection problem (two major factors standing 
behind the POT), thereby decreasing the cost of equity financing (e.g., Liu and Malatesta, 
2005). Companies with high CRs are usually those with large internal funds (Byoun, 2011) 
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 For U.S. and Japanese firms we present the results from Two-Step System GMM as in Table 3. We apply a 
One-Step System GMM due to a small sample sizes in smaller countries (for a more detailed interpretation see 
Roodman, 2008). Moreover, in order to minimize the number of instruments we only use 2 to 3 “collapsed” lags 
of independent variables as instruments. 
25
 We also conduct analyses with the exclusion of regulated industries, zero-debt observations, and alternative 
measures of TANG/TA, SIZE, and firm leverage ratios, as well as, non-lagged CRs. The results are robust and 
indicate an inverse and statistically significant relation between gearing ratios and CRs for MB, advanced and 
the U.S. panels. 
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and in line with the POT they use excess cash to pay back existing debt rather than repurchase 
equity (Myers, 1984). Furthermore, the negative relation between CRs and capital structure 
might stem from the fact that despite potentially easier access to cheap debt, highly rated 
companies do not issue it in order not to be downgraded
26
. The RATINGL1 coefficients are 
insignificant for the BB and Japanese samples of companies, which gives support for 
Hypothesis 1.  
Regarding the testing of Hypothesis 2, the coefficient on RATINGL1 in column 5 
(developing country sample) is not statistically significant
27
. This contrasts with the 
coefficient in column 4, which is consistent with our Hypothesis 2
28
. A major part of the 
overall, advanced and MB samples size is composed of firms based in the U.S. (or Japanese 
firms in the BB sample). Looking at the estimates shown in Table 3, we observe a high degree 
of similarity in coefficient estimates and their corresponding t-values for American, overall, 
MB, and advanced country samples. This fact in conjunction with the over-representation of 
the U.S. and Japan gives a reason to suspect that these 2 countries drive the results exhibited 
in columns 1 through 4.  
We apply a twofold solution to this drawback. First, we conduct additional analyses with 
American and Japanese firms excluded from the 4 potentially affected samples. Second, we 
present the results of analyses with 4 interaction variables RATINGL1*MBDUM, 
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 When CRAs assess firms’ creditworthiness, they pay close attention to firm indebtedness. In other words, the 
higher the company’s leverage, the higher the default probability and therefore a lower CR. Thus, the higher the 
CR, the less debt may be issued by a firm to avoid a fall in its CR, which in turn forces companies to maintain 
low leverage ratios (e.g., Shivdasani and Zenner, 2005). 
27
 As Flannery and Hankins (2013) point out, the System GMM results have low statistical significance when 
the size of sample is small and its length short. However, these estimates are not biased. 
28
 In the case of the BB and especially the developing country samples, the lower significances might be linked 
to the small number of observations and companies as compared to the MB or the advanced country samples of 
firms. However, this kind of problem is an intrinsic part of all capital structure studies conducted for the panel of 
countries e.g., Fan et al. (2012), Flannery and Hankins (2013), González and González (2008), and Öztekin and 
Flannery (2012). 
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RATINGL1*DEVDUM, RATINGL1*US, and RATINGL1*JAPAN capturing the hypothesized 
different impacts of CRs on firms' financing policies
29
. In both cases the results reconfirm our 
suspicion of the U.S. (and to a lesser extent Japan) driving the results. 
Table 4 reports the estimates of the overall, MB, BB, and advanced country panels 
(columns 1 through 4) truncated by dropping U.S. and Japanese firms (Columns 5 through 7 
exhibit the same estimates as in Table 3). First, as expected and in line with Flannery and 
Hankins (2013) due to diminished sizes of samples, the statistical significances of coefficients 
are smaller. Second, in line with Hypothesis 6 both the economic and statistical importance of 
coefficients on RATINGL1 falls in columns 1, 2, and 4, but increases in column 3. On the one 
hand, these changes suggest that a negative impact of CRs on leverage ratios was 
upward-biased (in absolute values) in columns 1, 2, and 4 of Table 3 because of the sheer 
number of companies from the U.S. On the other hand, the coefficient on RATINGL1 in 
column 3 is more statistically significant and has a higher absolute value (as compared with 
Table 3). These estimates indicate that the effect of a CR on a company’s debt ratio in Japan is 
weaker than in other BB countries as well as there is no significant difference in CR impacts 
on debt ratios between the MB and BB environments. In addition, the influence of CRs on 
capital structure remains statistically significant at the 1% level in the advanced sample. 
Summing up, the estimates from Table 4 are consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 6 but not with 
Hypothesis 1. 
[Table 4 here] 
4.4 Tests of Hypotheses 1 to 5 (Using the Interaction Terms) 
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 These interaction terms not only allow us to preserve a bigger sample by retaining all observations and firms, 
which in turn leads to more reliable results, but also serve as a proxy for the test of equality of coefficients 
between different samples. 
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Table 5 shows the results when we use an additional set of variables 
(RATINGL1*MBDUM, RATINGL1*DEVDUM, RATINGL1*BOND, RATINGL1*FINARCH, 
RATING*US, RATING*JAPAN, and RATINGL1*LAGLEV), which are used to capture the 
interactions between CRs and other variables, in order to assess the validity of Hypotheses 1 
to 5. In the last column (two columns) of Panels A to C, and F (Panel D), we reintroduce all 
significant interactions simultaneously as robustness measures
30
. The FINARCH variable is 
the first principal component of 3 indices representing the size, activity, and efficiency of the 
stock market relative to the banking system. The size index measures the size of equity 
markets as compared with that of the banking industry in each of the countries. A stock 
market’s size is captured by the ratio of the market capitalization of domestic stocks to the 
national GDP, whereas the size of the banking industry is given by the bank credit ratio
31
 
divided by GDP. This index merges these two measures into one ratio (the first divided by the 
second) such that the larger the ratio, the more MB-oriented the financial system. The activity 
index is formed by dividing the total value of shares traded relative to GDP by the bank credit 
ratio. The higher the value of the index, the greater the degree of MB financial orientation of a 
country. The efficiency index is calculated as the product of the turnover ratio (the ratio of the 
value of total shares traded to the average real market capitalization) and a bank’s overhead 
ratio, which is defined as a bank’s overhead costs as a share of its total asset. 
[Table 5 here] 
4.4.1 Tests of Hypothesis 1 
The coefficients on RATINGL1*MBDUM in column 1 (1 and 4) of Panels A and E (D) 
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 The MBDUM and FINARCH variables are 2 alternative proxies capturing the different financial orientation of 
countries’ financial systems. Thus, with respect to the overall, advanced, and developing samples we apply the 
interaction between MBDUM (FINARCH) and RATINGL1 separately in columns 1 (2). 
31
 Defined as deposit money banks assets in the given country. 
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indicate no significant difference in the CRs’ effect on firms’ capital structures between the 
MB and BB countries. This evidence is consistent with the existing studies (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995, 2003; Tadesse, 2006) which document that during the last two decades of the 
20th century the stock markets in many BB economies expanded rapidly in terms of market 
capitalization and equity financing. This finds support in Figure 1 which shows that by 1997, 
BB countries managed to catch up with MB countries in terms of the median values of 
FINARCH variable (measuring the size, activity and efficiency of stock markets as compared 
with banking industries corresponding features). Therefore, the statistically insignificant 
coefficients on RATINGL1*MBDUM
32
 are not surprising and cast doubt on the validity of a 
traditional MB/BB distinction in international studies of capital structure. Consequently, the 
arguments in favor of greater importance of CRs in countries traditionally regarded as MB do 
not hold. In light of this, we use the FINARCH variable as an additional and alternative 
measure of financial systems’ orientation affecting the relation between CRs and a capital 
structure. 
4.4.2 Tests of Hypothesis 2 
In Panels A, B, and C (Table 5), we interact RATINGL1 with DEVDUM. The coefficients 
shown in column 1 (1, 2, and 4 in case of Panel A) are consistent with Hypothesis 2. In 
general, the estimates suggest that there is a significant difference in the CR effect depending 
on the economic development of a country. This result suggests that in advanced countries, 
the link between higher CRs and increased equity issuance (as in the POT) outweighs the 
positive role of ratings on availability of credit at a lower price (according to the TOT). In a 
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 In case of Panel D, Table 5, the coefficient on RATINGL1*MBDUM is significant but not robust (statistically 
significant in column 1, but insignificant in column 4). 
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similar vein, in the case of developing countries the former effect is less (or the latter more) 
prominent or both.  
4.4.3 Tests of Hypothesis 3 
The coefficients on RATINGL1*BOND are a proxy for the different importance of a CR, 
depending on the size of the bond market as a share of GDP in a given country. Looking at 
Table 5, column 1 (and 2 in case of Panels A, D, and E), the coefficients are generally positive 
and statistically significant. However, after reintroducing all of the significant interaction 
terms in the last column, only in Panels A and D do the results provide strong statistical 
support for the claim that a larger and more developed bond market fosters a positive relation 
between CRs and firms’ debt ratios. 
4.4.4 Tests of Hypothesis 4 
The last prediction tested in Table 5, column 1 (or column 2 of Panels A, D, and E) is 
stated in Hypothesis 4. In order to check if the influence of a CR on companies’ gearing ratios 
grows together with the degree of financial system’s market orientation, we interact 
RATINGL1 with FINARCH. In contrast to the MB/BB differentiation, the FINARCH variable 
captures the overall development of stock markets in all groups of countries. The estimates in 
6 out of 7 Panels (except for the Japanese sample) are broadly in line with Hypothesis 4, i.e., 
they display negative signs for coefficients on RATINGL1*FINARCH and are statistically 
significant (in Panels A, B, D, and F). These results confirm a higher dependence of the 
capital structure on CRs when companies operate in an environment with more developed 
stock markets (those with higher FINARCH scores). The negative relation between CRs and 
capital structure is consistent with the POT. In other words, firms with better CRs have less 
asymmetric information/adverse selection leading to a lower degree of equity underpricing, 
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which is equivalent to a cheaper cost of capital (Liu and Malatesta, 2005). Thus, firms issue 
more equity and less debt (Frank and Goyal, 2009). Consequently, the more developed the 
equity market, the more significant this effect. Despite relatively high FINARCH values, this 
relation does not hold in the Japanese sample (in line with Hypothesis 6). As discussed before, 
the result for Japan may be due to mistrust of local investors and firms in CRs issued by U.S. 
based CRAs such as S&P. 
4.4.5 Tests of Hypothesis 5 
In Table 5, column 2 (3) of Panels B, C, F, and G (A, D, and E), we interact RATINGL1 
with LAGLEV. Except for the developing country sample of firms, the coefficients reported 
are uniformly positive. Furthermore, they are statistically significant (1% or 5% levels) in the 
overall, MB, BB, advanced, and U.S. Panels. These results suggest that the higher (lower) the 
CR, the slower (faster) the SOA. For the MB sample, the coefficient on RATINGL1*LAGLEV, 
is 0.0093 (Table 5, Panel B, Column 3). This means that a company with an AA credit rating 
closes almost 1% less of the gap between its actual and target gearing within 1 year than its 
counterpart with an AA- CR. In a similar vein, the difference in the SOAs between the firms 
with the highest and the lowest investment-grade CR (AAA versus BBB-) amount to over 8%. 
This evidence tells us that CRs are a proxy for the degree of firms’ financial constraints 
(e.g., Faulkender et al., 2012). According to Byoun (2011) firms with low CRs suffer from a 
shortage of internal funds. Thus, a firm with a poorer CR (Firm A) faces higher costs of 
accessing capital markets as compared to a firm with better CR (Firm B). Due to a lack of 
internal earnings to fund investment needs, Firm A often engages in capital market 
transactions. This in turn enables it to adjust its debt ratio at a relatively lower marginal cost 
(Faulkender et al., 2012). Likewise, Firm B with high CR, only rarely taps capital markets due 
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to sufficient internal funds for its investment needs. Therefore, the adjustment of its capital 
structure would require from it an additional “trip” to either the stock or the bond market, and 
thus, extra costs. In other words, the companies adjust with faster speed when the costs of this 
process are sunk relative to when these costs are incremental. Our estimates are also 
consistent with Korajczyk and Levy (2003), who document that financially unconstrained 
firms are more likely to deviate from their target gearing ratio in an attempt to time the 
markets by issuing/repurchasing securities when macroeconomic conditions are most 
favorable. 
4.5  Robustness Tests:  Robustness of Findings Across Different Rating Classes 
 In Table 6, motivated by the approach of Faulkender et al. (2012) and their argument of 
SOAs being highly dependent on CRs, we divide the previously estimated samples into two 
subsamples (firms with investment-grade CRs versus firms with speculative-grade CRs). The 
results are consistent with those from Table 5 and show that the SOAs are faster (slower) for 
firms with speculative (investment) CRs. Inspecting the results further, we conclude that the 
largest disparity in the SOAs between sub-samples occurs in the developing country firms. In 
this sample, companies with speculative (investment) CRs close about 47% (32%) of the gap 
between their actual and target debt ratios within 1 year, and with these speeds it takes 13 (21) 
months to close half the gap between firms’ desired and current gearing ratios. In other words, 
firms with below-investment CRs close approximately 15% more of the gap annually and 
they need a 8 months shorter period to close half of the distance between the 
above-mentioned debt ratios. The coefficients on the LAGLEV variable proxying for the 
SOAs of firms with different CRs suggest that Byoun (2011), Faulkender et al. (2012), and 
Korajczyk and Levy’s (2003) arguments hold in our research. The results also indicate that no 
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matter the financial orientation or economic development of the country in which firms are 
based, those with poorer CRs adjust faster towards their target gearing ratios. Summing up, 
the estimates from Table 6 offer additional support to Hypothesis 5. 
[Table 6 here] 
5. Conclusions 
Until recently, the impact of CRs on capital structure had been relatively neglected. Our 
paper extends prior research by investigating the role of CRs on firms’ capital structures and 
their SOAs towards a target level in 19 countries with different financial orientations and 
economic development. We find that except for Japan, the impact of CRs on capital structure 
is more significant and negative in countries with more market-oriented financial systems 
(measured by the FINARCH variable), whereas the traditional simple MB/BB division has no 
significant influence on the relation between CRs and firms’ gearing ratios. A likely 
explanation for this finding is the ability of FINARCH to capture the fluctuations in size, 
activity and efficiency of the stock markets relative to banks.  
The negative relation between CRs and gearing ratios is related to the POT. Companies 
with better CRs have smaller problems with asymmetric information and adverse selection 
and thus benefit from the decreased cost of equity financing. Thus, they issue more equity and 
less debt. Consequently, the more developed the equity market, the more significant this effect. 
Despite high FINARCH values, this relation is not observed in Japan, possibly due to mistrust 
of investors and firms in CRs issued by U.S.-based CRAs such as S&P. 
Furthermore, the relation between the CR and firms’ leverage ratios is negative and 
significantly stronger in advanced rather than in developing economies. This disparity has a 
twofold explanation. First, due to low presence, short history and high volatility of CRs in the 
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developing countries, their information role in the process of issuing equity or debt is less 
influential. Second, in developing economies, firms rely more on bank lending than their 
counterparts from advanced economies. In addition, our results are robust and indicate that 
regardless of financial orientation or economic development of a country, firms with poorer 
CRs enjoy faster SOAs.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Market-Based vs. Bank-Based Countries 
This table presents mean, median, standard deviation, total number of observations, minimum and maximum 
values for dependent variables and firm-level characteristics: MLLEV, MLEV, BLLEV, BLEV, EBIT/TA, MTB, 
SIZE, and TANG/TA (all winsorised at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile); S&P’s issuer credit rating: RATING; median 
industry leverage: MEDLEV; and macroeconomic variables: INFL, BOND, FINARCH, and DEVDUM during the 
whole period of investigation (from 1991 to 2010). The t-values and z-values are given for the two-sided t-test 
for equality of means and two-sided non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test for equality of medians respectively. 
Both tests investigate the differences between characteristics from market-basedvs. bank-based economies. The 
test statistics are equal to MB minus BB. *, **, and *** indicate that the hypothesized differences between 
means and medians are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable T-test
Non-par. 
test
Mean Median Std. dev. No. obs. Min. Max. Mean Median Std. dev. No. obs. Min. Max. T-Value Z-Value
Leverage
MLEV 0.183 0.155 0.131 2,282 0.000 0.731 0.190 0.166 0.120 1,212 0.000 0.699 -1.57 -2.97***
MLEVT 0.228 0.198 0.146 2,282 0.000 0.733 0.257 0.236 0.139 1,212 0.001 0.779 -5.60***  -6.66***
BLEV 0.239 0.220 0.144 2,282 0.000 0.854 0.223 0.206 0.133 1,212 0.000 0.727 3.25*** 2.78***
BLEVT 0.298 0.282 0.147 2,282 0.000 0.873 0.296 0.285 0.141 1,212 0.003 0.783 0.43 -0.11
Profitability
EBIT/TA 0.091 0.084 0.073 2,282 -0.217 0.366 0.079 0.068 0.059 1,212 -0.118 0.408 5.38*** 7.53***
Growth
MTB 1.269 1.067 0.792 2,282 0.187 6.460 0.920 0.805 0.561 1,212 0.056 5.585 15.09*** 15.82***
Firm Size
SIZE 8.711 8.741 1.404 2,282 4.295 12.407 9.586 9.717 1.585 1,212 4.923 12.622 -16.15*** -15.99***
Tangible Assets
TANG/TA 0.436 0.424 0.238 2,282 0.018 0.946 0.356 0.324 0.217 1,212 0.009 0.898 10.08*** 9.42***
Firm Rating
RATING 14.589 15 3.115 2,282 1 22 13.927 14 3.670 1,212 1 22 5.34*** 4.93***
(Corresponding 
S&P's grade) BBB+ BBB+ D AAA BBB BBB D AAA
Industry 
Characteristic
MEDLEV 0.173 0.155 0.099 2,282 0.006 0.575 0.182 0.163 0.094 1,212 0.000 0.687 4.02*** 13.45***
Macro. Variables
INFL 2.542 2.214 2.502 2,282 -4.023 34.999 3.699 1.978 5.283 1,212 -0.399 85.742 -7.20*** -0.02
BOND 67.620 70.431 25.089 2,282 6.876 125.063 75.928 82.235 36.177 1,212 1.831 147.418 -7.13*** -9.45***
FINARCH 0.367 0.359 1.272 2,281 -2.786 3.395 0.773 0.706 1.033 1,202 -2.283 2.855 -10.16*** -10.25***
DEVDUM 0.901 1 0.298 2,282 0 1 0.794 1 0.405 1,212 0 1 8.16*** 8.83***
Market-Based Countries 65.29 %  of annual 
sample's obs. (excl. the U.S.)
Bank-Based Countries 34.71 %  of annual 
sample's obs. (excl. Japan)
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Panel B: Advanced vs. Developing Countries  
This table presents mean, median, standard deviation, total number of observations, minimum and maximum 
values for winsorised at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile dependent variables and firm-level characteristics: MLLEV, 
MLEV, BLLEV, BLEV, EBIT/TA, MTB, SIZE, and TANG/TA (all winsorised at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile);  
S&P’s issuer credit rating: RATING; median industry leverage: MEDLEV; and macroeconomic variables: INFL, 
BOND, FINARCH, and MBDUM during the whole period of investigation (from 1991 to 2010). The t-values and 
z-values are given for the two-sided t-test for equality of means and two-sided non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis 
test for equality of medians respectively. Both tests investigate the differences between characteristics from 
advanced vs. developing countries. The test statistics are equal to advanced minus developing. *, **, and *** 
indicate that the hypothesized differences between means and medians are statistically significant at the10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable T-test
Non-par. 
test
Mean Median Std. dev. No. obs. Min. Max. Mean Median Std. dev. No. obs. Min. Max. T-Value Z-Value
Leverage
MLEV 0.181 0.157 0.124 3,019 0.000 0.716 0.211 0.184 0.142 475 0.000 0.731 -4.29*** -4.14***
MLEVT 0.232 0.205 0.140 3,019 0.000 0.779 0.278 0.248 0.163 475 0.001 0.741 -5.88*** -5.53***
BLEV 0.233 0.212 0.141 3,019 0.000 0.854 0.239 0.237 0.136 475 0.001 0.727 -0.83 -1.88*
BLEVT 0.296 0.281 0.146 3,019 0.000 0.873 0.302 0.298 0.142 475 0.004 0.783 -0.76 -1.40
Profitability
EBIT/TA 0.081 0.075 0.064 3,019 -0.217 0.366 0.122 0.107 0.088 475 -0.148 0.408 -9.69*** -10.09***
Growth
MTB 1.145 0.963 0.718 3,019 0.157 6.460 1.162 0.981 0.861 475 0.056 5.585 -0.40 1.00
Firm Size
SIZE 9.122 9.174 1.519 3,019 4.295 12.431 8.334 8.087 1.403 475 4.923 12.622 11.23*** 11.14***
Tangible Assets
TANG/TA 0.392 0.354 0.235 3,019 0.009 0.946 0.513 0.536 0.195 475 0.040 0.898 -12.23*** -11.33***
Firm Rating
RATING 14.854 15 3.074 3,019 1 22 11.208 11 3.185 475 1 17 23.29*** 21.18***
(Corresponding 
S&P's grade) BBB+ BBB+ D AAA BB BB D A
Industry 
Characteristic
MEDLEV 0.173 0.156 0.095 3,019 0.006 0.687 0.198 0.185 0.112 475 0.000 0.670 -4.82*** -4.88***
Macro. Variables
INFL 2.041 2.002 1.174 3,019 -4.023 9.069 8.680 6.363 7.535 475 -0.854 85.742 -19.16*** -31.39***
BOND 78.031 81.285 23.779 3,019 14.081 147.418 22.644 24.659 15.270 475 1.831 66.380 67.25*** 33.24***
FINARCH 0.524 0.557 1.190 3,008 -2.709 3.395 0.400 0.591 1.327 475 -2.786 2.855 1.92* 1.52
MBDUM 0.681 1 0.466 3,019 0 1 0.474 0 0.500 475 0 1 8.49*** 8.83***
Advanced Countries 86.41%  of annual sample's 
obs. (excl. the U.S. and Japan)
Developing Countries 13.59 %  of annual sample's 
obs. 
40 
 
Panel C: the U.S. vs. Japan  
This table presents mean, median, standard deviation, total number of observations, minimum and maximum 
values for winsorised at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile dependent variables and firm-level characteristics: MLLEV, 
MLEV, BLLEV, BLEV, EBIT/TA, MTB, SIZE, and TANG/TA (all winsorised at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile);  
S&P’s issuer credit rating: RATING; median industry leverage: MEDLEV; and macroeconomic variables: INFL, 
BOND, FINARCH during the whole period of investigation (from 1991 to 2010). The t-values and z-values are 
given for the two-sided t-test for equality of means and two-sided non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test for 
equality of medians respectively. Both tests investigate the differences between characteristics from the U.S. vs. 
Japan. The test statistics are equal to the U.S. minus Japan. *, **, and *** indicate that the hypothesized 
differences between means and medians are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable T-test
Non-par. 
test
Mean Median Std. dev. No. obs. Min. Max. Mean Median Std. dev. No. obs. Min. Max. T-Value Z-Value
Leverage
MLEV 0.215 0.192 0.150 11,729 0.000 0.669 0.174 0.149 0.139 1,823 0.000 0.562 11.68*** 11.59***
MLEVT 0.245 0.223 0.158 11,729 0.001 0.697 0.272 0.248 0.187 1,823 0.000 0.676 -5.89***  -4.75***
BLEV 0.290 0.270 0.167 11,729 0.000 0.811 0.195 0.176 0.146 1,823 0.000 0.590 25.03*** 23.38***
BLEVT 0.330 0.314 0.169 11,729 0.003 0.838 0.305 0.292 0.193 1,823 0.000 0.703 5.19*** 5.45***
Profitability
EBIT/TA 0.091 0.086 0.065 11,729 -0.131 0.280 0.053 0.045 0.039 1,823 -0.024 0.186 34.36*** 31.01***
Growth
MTB 1.336 1.075 0.820 11,729 0.410 5.212 0.939 0.832 0.450 1,823 0.311 3.004 30.58*** 25.65***
Firm Size
SIZE 8.163 8.036 1.330 11,729 5.401 11.710 9.393 9.390 1.131 1,823 6.988 12.029 -42.08*** -35.48***
Tangible Assets
TANG/TA 0.375 0.328 0.243 11,729 0.015 0.897 0.383 0.325 0.221 1,823 0.067 0.912 -1.37 -2.79***
Firm Rating
RATING 13.240 13 3.564 11,729 1 22 15.323 16 3.406 1,823 2 22 -24.13*** -22.72***
(Corresponding 
S&P's grade) BBB- BBB- D AAA BBB+ A- SD AAA
Industry 
Characteristic
MEDLEV 0.176 0.167 0.061 11,729 0.059 0.405 0.157 0.137 0.109 1,823 0.000 0.529 7.08*** 19.81***
Macro. Variables
INFL 2.517 2.805 1.024 11,729 -0.356 4.235 -0.083 -0.250 0.749 1,823 -1.347 3.298 130*** 60.94***
BOND 149.501 146.413 14.778 11,729 126.357 177.475 165.181 173.940 39.237 1,823 85.211 238.792 -16.88*** -18.66***
FINARCH 0.314 0.234 1.271 11,450 -2.207 2.547 0.713 0.159 1.619 1,823 -1.655 3.740 -10.06*** -7.52***
the U.S. 86.55 %  of annual sample's obs. 
(combined U.S & Japan)
Japan 13.45 %  of annual sample's obs. (combined 
U.S & Japan)
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Table 2: Average Leverage Ratios and Firm-Specific Characteristics by Different Credit 
Ratings 
Panel A: Market-Based Countries (excluding the U.S.) 
This table presents mean values for dependent variable: MLLEV, MLEV, BLLEV, and BLEV, as well as, 
firm-level characteristics: EBIT/TA, MTB, SIZE, TANG/TA after grouping companies according to their credit 
ratings. 
 
 
 
Panel B: Bank-Based Countries (excluding Japan) 
 
 
Panel C: Advanced Countries (excluding the U.S. and Japan) 
Credit 
Ratings N %  Share MLEV MLEVT BLEV BLEVT EBIT/TA MTB SIZE TANG/TA
Below B 40 5.33% 0.286 0.367 0.354 0.430 0.012 1.053 7.012 0.347
B 49 6.53% 0.338 0.377 0.334 0.370 0.017 0.770 7.582 0.420
BB 76 10.13% 0.218 0.268 0.250 0.309 0.090 1.317 8.018 0.390
BBB 304 40.53% 0.201 0.243 0.256 0.308 0.087 1.154 8.666 0.464
A 200 26.67% 0.160 0.203 0.222 0.281 0.096 1.365 9.279 0.442
AA 24 3.20% 0.081 0.117 0.122 0.183 0.116 1.710 9.706 0.270
AAA 57 7.60% 0.078 0.122 0.126 0.213 0.086 1.715 9.646 0.407
750 100%
Credit 
Ratings N %  Share MLEV MLEVT BLEV BLEVT EBIT/TA MTB SIZE TANG/TA
Below B 50 10.87% 0.243 0.401 0.230 0.336 0.070 0.667 7.125 0.526
B 38 8.26% 0.266 0.344 0.294 0.366 0.095 0.833 7.736 0.377
BB 94 20.43% 0.214 0.267 0.250 0.310 0.097 1.024 8.682 0.337
BBB 164 35.65% 0.187 0.253 0.205 0.275 0.072 0.839 9.888 0.330
A 73 15.87% 0.158 0.222 0.203 0.282 0.069 0.948 10.431 0.320
AA 38 8.26% 0.084 0.134 0.120 0.191 0.114 1.008 11.117 0.424
AAA 3 0.65% 0.026 0.058 0.034 0.076 0.033 0.634 10.946 0.226
460 100%
Credit 
Ratings N %  Share MLEV MLEVT BLEV BLEVT EBIT/TA MTB SIZE TANG/TA
Below B 38 3.71% 0.290 0.380 0.367 0.459 0.021 1.093 7.192 0.295
B 52 5.07% 0.300 0.346 0.329 0.376 0.024 0.797 7.685 0.345
BB 128 12.49% 0.217 0.263 0.254 0.310 0.081 1.156 8.269 0.284
BBB 413 40.29% 0.195 0.243 0.240 0.299 0.074 1.009 9.144 0.413
A 272 26.54% 0.160 0.208 0.216 0.281 0.089 1.244 9.597 0.409
AA 62 6.05% 0.083 0.128 0.121 0.188 0.115 1.280 10.571 0.365
AAA 60 5.85% 0.076 0.119 0.121 0.206 0.083 1.661 9.711 0.398
1,025 100%
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Panel D: Developing Countries 
 
 
Panel E: the U.S. 
 
 
Panel F: Japan 
 
 
  
Credit 
Ratings N %  Share MLEV MLEVT BLEV BLEVT EBIT/TA MTB SIZE TANG/TA
Below B 52 28.11% 0.241 0.391 0.225 0.319 0.062 0.652 6.989 0.556
B 35 18.92% 0.317 0.388 0.298 0.356 0.092 0.798 7.596 0.484
BB 42 22.70% 0.213 0.282 0.239 0.310 0.133 1.151 8.738 0.595
BBB 55 29.73% 0.204 0.272 0.226 0.278 0.140 1.304 8.720 0.446
A 1 0.54% 0.063 0.080 0.301 0.382 0.067 3.698 6.969 0.554
185 100%
Credit 
Ratings N %  Share MLEV MLEVT BLEV BLEVT EBIT/TA MTB SIZE TANG/TA
Below B 430 8.79% 0.361 0.403 0.432 0.481 0.004 0.968 7.266 0.398
B 508 10.39% 0.369 0.398 0.438 0.470 0.032 1.061 7.233 0.379
BB 1,009 20.63% 0.257 0.280 0.332 0.360 0.084 1.179 7.683 0.339
BBB 1,445 29.54% 0.198 0.225 0.265 0.301 0.090 1.187 8.456 0.410
A 1,128 23.06% 0.136 0.170 0.215 0.267 0.117 1.610 8.727 0.381
AA 218 4.46% 0.073 0.104 0.154 0.222 0.150 2.248 9.700 0.415
AAA 153 3.13% 0.040 0.084 0.086 0.176 0.172 2.697 10.382 0.310
4,891 100%
Credit 
Ratings N %  Share MLEV MLEVT BLEV BLEVT EBIT/TA MTB SIZE TANG/TA
Below B 18 2.50% 0.234 0.518 0.249 0.556 0.018 0.740 9.017 0.229
B 32 4.44% 0.262 0.515 0.266 0.530 0.029 0.697 9.382 0.384
BB 121 16.78% 0.252 0.440 0.279 0.487 0.038 0.878 9.065 0.452
BBB 189 26.21% 0.148 0.244 0.172 0.285 0.055 0.967 8.918 0.336
A 180 24.97% 0.102 0.162 0.124 0.198 0.066 1.072 9.361 0.319
AA 151 20.94% 0.250 0.309 0.271 0.336 0.062 1.024 10.165 0.545
AAA 30 4.16% 0.144 0.234 0.183 0.286 0.044 0.932 11.636 0.328
721 100%
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Table 3: Determinants of Firms’ Capital Structures (Two-Step System GMM) 
See Appendix A for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic development level. 
See Appendix B for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent variable is long-term leverage to 
the market value of total assets ratio (MLLEV). m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of 
the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Instruments for 
the transformed equation in all columns are MLLEV(t-2), EBIT/TA(t-2), MTB(t-2), SIZE(t-2), TANG/TA(t-2), 
RATINGL1(t-2), MEDLEV(t-2), and further lags. Instruments for the levels equation in all columns are ΔMLLEV(t-1), 
ΔEBIT/TA(t-1), ΔMTB(t-1), ΔSIZE(t-1), ΔTANG/TA(t-1), ΔRATINGL1(t-1), ΔMEDLEV(t-1), and further lags. T-statistics 
based on asymptotic standard errors that are robust to small sample bias, heteroskedasticity, and clustered by the 
firms are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate coefficient significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Year and country dummies are included, but not presented.  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LAGLEV + 0.6375*** 0.6402*** 0.6792*** 0.6406*** 0.5219*** 0.6527*** 0.7460***
(32.35) (30.29) (10.81) (31.28) (3.95) (29.09) (9.60)
EBIT/TA - -0.1454*** -0.1632*** -0.0406 -0.1478*** -0.1512 -0.1691*** -0.2513*
(-5.52) (-6.06) (-0.26) (-5.66) (-0.45) (-5.46) (-1.79)
MTB - -0.0166*** -0.0170*** 0.0089 -0.0173*** 0.0139 -0.0179*** 0.0019
(-7.28) (-6.97) (0.54) (-7.33) (0.62) (-6.56) (0.08)
SIZE + -0.0009 -0.0014 0.0150 -0.0001 -0.0153 -0.0031 -0.0023
(-0.53) (-0.67) (0.91) (-0.05) (-0.65) (-1.42) (-0.19)
TANG/TA + 0.0060 -0.0022 0.0238 0.0077 0.0750 -0.0009 0.0442
(0.55) (-0.21) (0.32) (0.75) (0.64) (-0.08) (0.32)
RATINGL1 - -0.0039*** -0.0042*** -0.0041 -0.0044*** 0.0043 -0.0037*** 0.0005
(-5.02) (-4.84) (-1.03) (-5.48) (0.73) (-4.00) (0.16)
MEDLEV + 0.2755*** 0.2430*** 0.1921* 0.2522*** 0.4454*** 0.2316*** 0.0398
(9.39) (7.71) (1.65) (9.13) (2.81) (6.61) (0.23)
INFL + 0.0005 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0034*** 0.0009 0.0159*** 0.0177***
(0.91) (-0.07) (0.41) (3.21) (0.80) (11.03) (4.03)
BOND + 0.0001 -0.0003** -0.0000 0.0001** 0.0004 -0.0007* -0.0000
(1.40) (-2.29) (-0.35) (2.17) (0.48) (-1.77) (-0.02)
FINARCH - -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0019 -0.0007 -0.0024 0.0134*** -0.0015
(-0.66) (-0.54) (0.63) (-0.92) (-0.31) (6.51) (-0.09)
MBDUM - 0.0120*** -0.0190** -0.0747
(3.10) (-2.08) (-0.86)
DEVDUM + 0.0090 0.0613*** 0.0492
(0.48) (3.14) (1.03)
Firms 1,513 1,133 380 1,451 62 904 240
Observations 15,472 12,811 2,661 15,061 411 10,765 1,583
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1994-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010
m1(Z-statistic) -11.52*** -10.74*** -6.17*** -11.16*** -2.97*** -9.95*** -3.40***
m2(Z-statistic) 0.70 0.62 0.65 0.54 1.19 0.68 1.38
Hansen test (p-value) 0.29 0.60 0.47 0.21 0.81 0.37 0.17
Independent 
Variable
Expected 
Sign
All 
Countries
MB 
Countries
BB 
Countries
Advanced 
Countries
Developing 
Countries
the U.S. Japan
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Table 4: Determinants of Firms’ Capital Structures; Truncated Samples (Two-Step 
System GMM) 
See Appendix A for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic development level. 
See Appendix B for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent variable is long-term leverage to 
the market value of total assets ratio (MLLEV). m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of 
the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Instruments for 
the transformed equation in all columns are MLLEV(t-2), EBIT/TA(t-2), MTB(t-2), SIZE(t-2), TANG/TA(t-2), 
RATINGL1(t-2), MEDLEV(t-2), and further lags. Instruments for the levels equation in all columns are ΔMLLEV(t-1), 
ΔEBIT/TA(t-1), ΔMTB(t-1), ΔSIZE(t-1), ΔTANG/TA(t-1), ΔRATINGL1(t-1), ΔMEDLEV(t-1), and further lags. T-statistics 
based on asymptotic standard errors that are robust to small sample bias, heteroskedasticity, and clustered by the 
firms are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate coefficient significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Year and country dummies are included, but not presented. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LAGLEV + 0.5906*** 0.5931*** 0.6008*** 0.6240*** 0.5219*** 0.6527*** 0.7460***
(16.21) (9.96) (7.69) (18.40) (3.95) (29.09) (9.60)
EBIT/TA - -0.0485 -0.1874** -0.4710* -0.0668 -0.1512 -0.1691*** -0.2513*
(-1.04) (-2.48) (-1.94) (-1.27) (-0.45) (-5.46) (-1.79)
MTB - -0.0056 0.0000 0.0674** -0.0050 0.0139 -0.0179*** 0.0019
(-1.55) (0.02) (2.07) (-1.33) (0.62) (-6.56) (0.08)
SIZE + 0.0012 0.0064 -0.0024 0.0047 -0.0153 -0.0031 -0.0023
(0.34) (0.89) (-0.25) (1.48) (-0.65) (-1.42) (-0.19)
TANG/TA + 0.0038 0.0593 -0.0928 0.0134 0.0750 -0.0009 0.0442
(0.18) (1.16) (-1.14) (0.77) (0.64) (-0.08) (0.32)
RATINGL1 - -0.0018 -0.0002 -0.0058 -0.0038*** 0.0043 -0.0037*** 0.0005
(-1.49) (-0.10) (-1.15) (-3.24) (0.73) (-4.00) (0.16)
MEDLEV + 0.4221*** 0.3519*** 0.2347* 0.3612*** 0.4454*** 0.2316*** 0.0398
(8.67) (4.50) (1.66) (8.39) (2.81) (6.61) (0.23)
INFL + 0.0003 0.0000 0.0023** -0.0019 0.0009 0.0159*** 0.0177***
(0.55) (0.06) (2.10) (-1.12) (0.80) (11.03) (4.03)
BOND + -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0006 -0.0000 0.0004 -0.0007* -0.0000
(-0.66) (-1.16) (1.33) (-0.05) (0.48) (-1.77) (-0.02)
FINARCH - 0.0006 0.0003 0.0061 0.0007 -0.0024 0.0134*** -0.0015
(0.43) (0.21) (0.71) (0.49) (-0.31) (6.51) (-0.09)
MBDUM - 0.0021 0.0033 -0.0747
(0.21) (0.32) (-0.86)
DEVDUM + 0.0186 0.0212 -0.0119
(0.95) (1.50) (-0.27)
Firms 369 229 140 307 62 904 240
Observations 3,124 2,046 1,078 2,713 411 10,765 1,583
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1992-2010 1991-2010 1994-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010
m1(Z-statistic) -8.05*** -6.42*** -4.82*** -8.12*** -2.97*** -9.95*** -3.40***
m2(Z-statistic) -0.22 0.09 0.54 0.15 1.19 0.68 1.38
Hansen test (p-value) 0.42 0.63 -0.62 -1.43 0.81 0.37 0.17
Developing 
Countries
the U.S. JapanIndependent 
Variable
Expected 
Sign
All 
Countries 
(excl. the 
U.S. & 
Japan)
MB 
Countries 
(excl. the 
U.S.)
BB 
Countries 
(excl. Japan)
Advanced 
Countries 
(excl. the 
U.S. & 
Japan)
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Table 5: Two-Step System GMM (with Interaction Terms) 
Panel A: All Countries 
The dependent variable is long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLLEV). m1 and m2 are 
tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no 
serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the 
null of instrument validity. The same set of instruments as in Tables 3 and 4 applies to all columns. Additional 
instruments used for the transformed equation are: RATINGL1(t-2)*MBDUM(t-2) (column 1), 
RATINGL1(t-2)*FINARCH(t-2) (columns 2 & 4), RATINGL1(t-2)*DEVDUM(t-2), RATINGL1(t-2)*BOND(t-2), and 
RATINGL1(t-2)*US(t-2) (columns 1, 2, & 4), RATINGL1(t-2)*JAPAN(t-2) (columns 1 & 2), 
RATINGL1(t-2)*LAGLEV(t-2) (columns 3 & 4), and further lags. Additional instruments used for the levels 
equation are: Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*MBDUM(t-1)) (column 1), Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*FINARCH(t-1)) (columns 2 & 4), 
Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*DEVDUM(t-1)), Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*BOND(t-1)), and Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*US(t-1)) (columns 1, 2, & 4), 
Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*JAPAN(t-1)) (columns 1 & 2), Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*LAGLEV(t-1)) (columns 3 & 4), and further lags. 
T-statistics based on asymptotic standard errors that are robust to small sample bias, heteroskedasticity, and 
clustered by the firms are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate coefficient significances at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. Year and country dummies are included, but not presented. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent      Variable Expected 
Sign 
Hypotheses 1 
to 3 
Hypotheses 2 
to 4 
Hypothesis 5 All 
Significant 
LAGLEV + 0.6457*** 0.6480*** 0.5190*** 0.5557*** 
    (33.07) (33.57) (10.54) (11.60) 
EBIT/TA - -0.1417*** -0.1323*** -0.1551*** -0.1342*** 
    (-5.36) (-5.14) (-6.04) (-5.11) 
MTB - -0.0149*** -0.0146*** -0.0140*** -0.0137*** 
    (-6.58) (-6.63) (-6.67) (-6.66) 
SIZE + -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0004 0.0000 
    (-0.50) (-0.46) (-0.25) (0.03) 
TANG/TA + 0.0086 0.0066 -0.0061 0.0006 
    (0.85) (0.67) (-0.61) (0.07) 
RATINGL1 - 0.0039 0.0038* -0.0060*** 0.0015 
    (1.48) (1.72) (-5.93) (0.73) 
MEDLEV + 0.2931*** 0.2953*** 0.2563*** 0.2625*** 
    (11.03) (11.24) (8.74) (9.77) 
INFL + 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 
    (1.16) (1.34) (0.90) (1.30) 
BOND + -0.0002 -0.0007*** 0.0001** -0.0004** 
    (-1.19) (-2.80) (1.94) (-2.03) 
FINARCH - -0.0005 0.0101*** -0.0003 0.0091*** 
    (-0.66) (2.82) (-0.42) (2.71) 
MBDUM - 0.0475** 0.0525*** 0.0131*** 0.0673*** 
    (2.42) (2.82) (3.59) (4.50) 
DEVDUM + 0.1055*** 0.1774*** 0.0033 0.1052*** 
Interaction Variables   (2.21) (3.69) (0.19) (3.17) 
RATINGL1*MBDUM - 0.0034       
    (1.46)       
RATINGL1*FINARCH -   -0.0007***   -0.0007*** 
      (-3.08)   (-3.00) 
RATINGL1*DEVDUM - -0.0110*** -0.0103***   -0.0090*** 
    (-3.88) (-4.19)   (-3.78) 
RATINGL1*BOND + 0.0000* 0.0001***   0.0000*** 
    (1.78) (3.45)   (2.82) 
RATINGL1*US - -0.0043** -0.0062***   -0.0037*** 
    (-2.23) (-3.33)   (-3.87) 
RATINGL1*JAPAN + 0.0016 -0.0032     
    (0.64) (-1.49)     
RATINGL1*LAGLEV +     0.0111*** 0.0084** 
        (3.04) (2.39) 
Firms   1,513 1,513 1,513 1,513 
Observations   15,472 15,472 15,472 15,472 
Period of Est.   1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 
m1(Z-statistic)   -11.58*** -11.58*** -11.98*** -11.65*** 
m2(Z-statistic)   0.66 0.65 0.74 0.74 
Hansen test (p-value)   0.38 0.51 0.44 0.27 
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Panel B: Market-Based Countries 
See Appendix A for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic development level. 
See Appendix B for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent variable is long-term leverage to 
the market value of total assets ratio (MLLEV). m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of 
the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. The same set of 
instruments as in Tables 3 & 4 applies to all columns. Additional instruments used for the transformed equation 
are: RATINGL1(t-2)*FINARCH(t-2), RATINGL1(t-2)*DEVDUM(t-2), RATINGL1(t-2)*BOND(t-2), and 
RATINGL1(t-2)*US(t-2) (columns 1 & 3), RATINGL1(t-2)*LAGLEV(t-2) (columns 2 & 3), and further lags. Additional 
instruments used for the levels equation are: Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*FINARCH(t-1)), Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*DEVDUM(t-1)), 
Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*BOND(t-1)), and Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*US(t-1)) (columns 1 & 3), Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*LAGLEV(t-1)) 
(columns 2 & 3), and further lags. T-statistics based on asymptotic standard errors that are robust to small sample 
bias, heteroskedasticity, and clustered by the firms are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate coefficient 
significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Year and country dummies are included, but not 
presented. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Independent      Variable Expected 
Sign 
Hypotheses 2 
to 4 
Hypothesis 5 All 
Significant 
LAGLEV + 0.6563*** 0.5624*** 0.5559*** 
    (32.05) (9.91) (9.62) 
EBIT/TA - -0.1615*** -0.1577*** -0.1558*** 
    (-5.76) (-5.82) (-5.60) 
MTB - -0.0134*** -0.0138*** -0.0117*** 
    (-5.29) (-6.27) (-5.20) 
SIZE + -0.0007 -0.0004 0.0003 
    (-0.34) (-0.22) (0.20) 
TANG/TA + -0.0036 -0.0095 -0.0143 
    (-0.32) (-0.94) (-1.35) 
RATINGL1 - 0.0040 -0.0056*** 0.0024 
    (1.28) (-4.89) (0.78) 
MEDLEV + 0.2699*** 0.2182*** 0.2508*** 
    (8.70) (6.62) (8.24) 
INFL + -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
    (-0.07) (-0.14) (-0.08) 
BOND + -0.0013*** -0.0002* -0.0008** 
    (-3.22) (-1.94) (-2.00) 
FINARCH - 0.0130*** -0.0006 0.0128*** 
    (3.12) (-0.62) (3.06) 
DEVDUM + 0.3193*** 0.0489*** 0.2587*** 
Interaction Variables   (4.98) (2.58) (3.76) 
RATINGL1*FINARCH - -0.0010***   -0.0009*** 
    (-3.44)   (-3.35) 
RATINGL1*DEVDUM - -0.0088**   -0.0070** 
    (-2.54)   (-2.02) 
RATINGL1*BOND + 0.0001***   0.0000 
    (2.57)   (1.37) 
RATINGL1*US - -0.0094***   -0.0073*** 
    (-3.78)   (-2.81) 
RATINGL1*LAGLEV +   0.0085** 0.0093** 
      (1.98) (2.13) 
Firms   1,133 1,133 1,133 
Observations   12,811 12,811 12,811 
Period of Est.   1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 
m1(Z-statistic)   -10.84*** -11.14*** -11.19*** 
m2(Z-statistic)   0.64 0.69 0.69 
Hansen test (p-value)   0.26 0.20 0.50 
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Panel C: Bank-Based Countries 
See Appendix A for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic development level. 
See Appendix B for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent variable is long-term leverage to 
the market value of total assets ratio (MLLEV). m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of 
the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. The same set of 
instruments as in Tables 3 & 4 applies to all columns. Additional instruments used for the transformed equation 
are: RATINGL1(t-2)*FINARCH(t-2), RATINGL1(t-2)*JAPAN(t-2) (column 1), RATINGL1(t-2)*DEVDUM(t-2), 
RATINGL1(t-2)*BOND(t-2), (columns 1 & 3), RATINGL1(t-2)*LAGLEV(t-2) (columns 2 & 3), and further lags. 
Additional instruments used for the levels equation are: Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*FINARCH(t-1)), 
Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*JAPAN(t-1)) (column 1), Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*DEVDUM(t-1)), Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*BOND(t-1)) (columns 
1 & 3), Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*LAGLEV(t-1)) (columns 2 & 3), and further lags. T-statistics based on asymptotic 
standard errors that are robust to small sample bias, heteroskedasticity, and clustered by the firms are below the 
coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate coefficient significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Year 
and country dummies are included, but not presented. 
 
 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Independent      
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Hypotheses 
2 to 4 
Hypothesis 
5 
All 
Significant 
LAGLEV + 0.5496*** 0.4653*** 0.5198*** 
    (9.38) (4.69) (7.41) 
EBIT/TA - -0.1442 -0.0971 -0.1161* 
    (-1.51) (-1.12) (-1.76) 
MTB - -0.0091 -0.0112 -0.0175** 
    (-0.85) (-1.45) (-2.35) 
SIZE + 0.0063 0.0064** 0.0058** 
    (1.10) (2.36) (2.13) 
TANG/TA + 0.0004 0.0215 0.0221 
    (0.01) (0.86) (1.06) 
RATINGL1 - 0.0015 -0.0054*** 0.0030 
    (0.28) (-2.80) (0.87) 
MEDLEV + 0.3698*** 0.2550*** 0.2915*** 
    (4.25) (4.96) (5.02) 
INFL + 0.0007 0.0009 0.0007 
    (0.95) (1.08) (1.01) 
BOND + -0.0006 -0.0000 -0.0004 
    (-1.25) (-0.41) (-1.11) 
FINARCH - 0.0079 0.0007 0.0012 
    (0.95) (0.37) (0.64) 
DEVDUM + 0.1505* 0.0369 0.1580*** 
Interaction Variables   (1.91) (1.54) (3.07) 
RATINGL1*FINARCH - -0.0004     
    (-0.81)     
RATINGL1*DEVDUM - -0.0118*   -0.0117*** 
    (-1.76)   (-2.97) 
RATINGL1*BOND + 0.0000*   0.0000 
    (1.70)   (1.43) 
RATINGL1*JAPAN + 0.0009     
    (0.17)     
RATINGL1*LAGLEV +   0.0130** 0.0078* 
      (2.07) (1.75) 
Firms   380 380 380 
Observations   2,661 2,661 2,661 
Period of Est.   1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 
m1(Z-statistic)   -5.30*** -5.99*** -5.84*** 
m2(Z-statistic)   0.38 0.51 0.39 
Hansen test (p-value)   0.67 0.81 0.72 
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Panel D: Advanced Countries 
See Appendix A for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic development level. 
See Appendix B for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent variable is long-term leverage to 
the market value of total assets ratio (MLLEV). m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of 
the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. The same set of 
instruments as in Tables 3 & 4 applies to all columns. Additional instruments used for the transformed equation 
are: RATINGL1(t-2)*MBDUM(t-2) (columns 1 & 4), RATINGL1(t-2)*FINARCH(t-2) (columns 2 & 5), 
RATINGL1(t-2)*BOND(t-2), and RATINGL1(t-2)*US(t-2) (columns 1, 2, 4, & 5), RATINGL1(t-2)*JAPAN(t-2) (columns 1 
& 2), RATINGL1(t-2)*LAGLEV(t-2) (columns 3, 4, & 5), and further lags. Additional instruments used for the 
levels equation are: Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*MBDUM(t-1)) (columns 1 & 4), Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*FINARCH(t-1)) (columns 2 
& 5), Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*BOND(t-1)), and Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*US(t-1)) (columns 1, 2, 4, & 5), 
Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*JAPAN(t-1)) (columns 1 & 2), Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*LAGLEV(t-1)) (columns 3, 4, & 5), and further 
lags. T-statistics based on asymptotic standard errors that are robust to small sample bias, heteroskedasticity, and 
clustered by the firms are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate coefficient significances at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. Year and country dummies are included, but not presented. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Independent      
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Hypotheses  
1 and 3 
Hypotheses  
3 and 4 
Hypothesis 
5 
All 
Significant 
All 
Significant 
LAGLEV + 0.6487*** 0.6569*** 0.5447*** 0.5669*** 0.5599*** 
    (33.38) (32.88) (10.51) (11.02) (10.85) 
EBIT/TA - -0.133*** -0.1317*** -0.1540*** -0.1444*** -0.1355*** 
    (-5.01) (-5.00) (-5.96) (-5.65) (-5.29) 
MTB - -0.0161*** -0.014*** -0.0154*** -0.0146*** -0.0147*** 
    (-7.22) (-6.27) (-7.16) (-6.87) (-7.09) 
SIZE + -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0001 
    (-0.18) (-0.14) (0.27) (-0.11) (0.10) 
TANG/TA + 0.0094 0.0085 -0.0016 0.0002 0.0019 
    (0.95) (0.83) (-0.17) (0.02) (0.20) 
RATINGL1 - -0.0085*** -0.0064*** -0.0060*** -0.0070*** -0.0075*** 
    (-3.60) (-3.98) (-5.71) (-3.50) (-4.48) 
MEDLEV + 0.2664*** 0.2691*** 0.2313*** 0.2453*** 0.2313*** 
    (10.55) (10.35) (8.13) (8.94) (8.65) 
INFL + 0.0026** 0.0027*** 0.0031*** 0.0025** 0.0022** 
    (2.55) (2.58) (3.02) (2.43) (2.26) 
BOND + -0.0002 -0.0008*** 0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.0004** 
    (-1.05) (-2.80) (2.78) (-0.85) (-2.05) 
FINARCH - -0.0004 0.011*** -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0093*** 
    (-0.54) (2.86) (-0.70) (-0.54) (2.65) 
MBDUM - 0.0417** 0.0465** 0.0079* 0.0270 0.0603*** 
Interaction Variables   (2.16) (2.47) (1.85) (1.64) (4.16) 
RATINGL1*MBDUM - 0.0052**     0.0024   
    (2.02)     (1.17)   
RATINGL1*FINARCH -   -0.0008***     -0.0007*** 
      (-3.12)     (-2.94) 
RATINGL1*BOND + 0.0001* 0.0001***   0.0000 0.0000*** 
    (1.70) (3.47)   (1.47) (2.80) 
RATINGL1*US - -0.0045** -0.0065***   -0.0038** -0.0035*** 
    (-2.37) (-3.47)   (-1.96) (-3.83) 
RATINGL1*JAPAN + 0.0030 -0.0036       
    (1.17) (-1.64)       
RATINGL1*LAGLEV +     0.0090** 0.0074* 0.0083** 
        (2.35) (1.95) (2.19) 
Firms   1,451 1,451 1,451 1,451 1,451 
Observations   15,061 15,061 15,061 15,061 15,061 
Period of Est.   1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 
m1(Z-statistic)    -11.25*** -11.25*** -11.57*** -11.56*** -11.59*** 
m2(Z-statistic)   0.53 0.54 0.59 0.58 0.57 
Hansen test (p-value)   0.59 0.20 0.64 0.39 0.39 
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Panel E: Developing Countries 
See Appendix A for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic development level. 
See Appendix B for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent variable is long-term leverage to 
the market value of total assets ratio (MLLEV). m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of 
the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. The same set of 
instruments as in Tables 3 & 4 applies to all columns. Additional instruments used for the transformed equation 
are: RATINGL1(t-2)*MBDUM(t-2) (column 1), RATINGL1(t-2)*FINARCH(t-2) (column 2), RATINGL1(t-2)*BOND(t-2) 
(columns 1 & 2), RATINGL1(t-2)*LAGLEV(t-2) (column 3), and further lags. Additional instruments used for the 
levels equation are: Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*MBDUM(t-1)) (column 1), Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*FINARCH(t-1)) (column 2), 
Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*BOND(t-1)) (columns 1 & 2), Δ(RATINGL1(t-1)*LAGLEV(t-1)) (column 3), and further lags. 
T-statistics based on asymptotic standard errors that are robust to small sample bias, heteroskedasticity, and 
clustered by the firms are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate coefficient significances at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. Year and country dummies are included, but not presented. 
 
 (1) (2) (3)
LAGLEV + 0.5832*** 0.5032*** 0.9509*
(3.83) (3.48) (1.77)
EBIT/TA - -0.0860 -0.1494 -0.2405
(-0.34) (-0.77) (-0.77)
MTB - 0.0081 0.0134 0.0228
(0.33) (0.72) (1.02)
SIZE + -0.0102 -0.0362 -0.0165
(-0.43) (-1.48) (-0.44)
TANG/TA + 0.0762 -0.0095 -0.0248
(0.73) (-0.11) (-0.18)
RATINGL1 - 0.0033 0.0081 0.0156
(0.36) (0.96) (1.03)
MEDLEV + 0.3952* 0.4820*** 0.4741**
(1.76) (2.60) (2.27)
INFL + 0.0005 0.0010 0.0007
(0.39) (0.72) (0.52)
BOND + -0.0019 0.0024 0.0006
(-0.38) (0.55) (0.38)
FINARCH - -0.0025 0.0319 0.0047
(-0.22) (1.08) (0.47)
MBDUM - -0.0449 -0.1912* -0.1219
Interaction Variables (-0.31) (-1.88) (-0.84)
RATINGL1*MBDUM - -0.0019
(-0.18)
RATINGL1*FINARCH - -0.0029
(-1.27)
RATINGL1*BOND + 0.0002 -0.0000
(0.45) (-0.17)
RATINGL1*LAGLEV + -0.0379
(-0.77)
Firms 62 62 62
Observations 411 411 411
Period of Est. 1994-2010 1994-2010 1994-2010
m1(Z-statistic) -3.21*** -3.02*** -2.75***
m2(Z-statistic) 1.24 1.46 1.19
Hansen test (p-value) 0.50 0.79 0.11
Independent      
Variable
Expected 
Sign
Hypotheses  
1 and 3
Hypotheses  
3 and 4
Hypothesis 
5
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Table 6: SOAs for Firms with Investment and Speculative Credit Ratings (Two-Step 
System GMM) 
Panel A: Market-Based and Bank-Based Countries (excluding the U.S. and Japan) 
See Appendix A for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic development level. 
See Appendix B for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent variable is long-term leverage to 
the market value of total assets ratio (MLLEV). m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of 
the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Instruments for 
the transformed equation in all columns are MLLEV(t-2), EBIT/TA(t-2), MTB(t-2), SIZE(t-2), TANG/TA(t-2), 
MEDLEV(t-2), and further lags. Instruments for the levels equation in all columns are ΔMLLEV(t-1), ΔEBIT/TA(t-1), 
ΔMTB(t-1), ΔSIZE(t-1), ΔTANG/TA(t-1), ΔMEDLEV(t-1), and further lags. T-statistics based on asymptotic standard 
errors that are robust to small sample bias, heteroskedasticity, and clustered by the firms are in the parentheses. *, 
**, and *** indicate coefficient significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Year and country 
dummies are included, but not presented. The Investment-Grade (Speculative-Grade) column reports estimated 
coefficients for all firms with S&P’s issuer credit ratings BBB- or above (BB+ or below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LAGLEV + 0.6145*** 0.5316*** 0.5349*** 0.4881***
(10.28) (3.91) (5.01) (2.65)
EBIT/TA - -0.1100 -0.2400 0.006 0.3092
(-1.22) (-1.49) (0.01) (0.64)
MTB - -0.0047 -0.0206 0.0299 -0.0071
(-0.76) (-1.12) (1.15) (-0.17)
SIZE + 0.0079 0.0178 0.0193 0.0150
(0.72) (0.63) (1.38) (0.45)
TANG/TA + 0.0616 -0.0089 -0.0515 0.1426
(1.17) (-0.09) (-0.62) (1.04)
MEDLEV + 0.2235** 0.3939*** 0.3942** 0.9743***
(2.64) (3.02) (2.56) (3.53)
INFL + 0.0014 -0.0035 -0.0047 0.0005
(1.13) (-1.58) (-1.30) (0.46)
BOND + -0.0003 0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0014
(-1.43) (0.90) (-0.61) (-0.84)
FINARCH - -0.0012 0.0091 -0.0039 0.0012
(-0.99) (1.33) (-0.47) (0.09)
DEVDUM + 0.0111 0.0341 -0.0107 0.1360
(0.80) (0.63) (-0.13) (1.03)
Firms 187 78 92 74
Observations 1,628 418 735 343
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1992-2010 1992-2010
m1(Z-statistic) -5.59*** -3.17*** -4.01*** -2.58***
m2(Z-statistic) -1.65* 1.01 -0.18 -0.17
Hansen test (p-value) 0.73 0.49 0.35 0.12
MB Countries (excl. the U.S.) BB Countries (excl. Japan)
Independent 
Variable
Expected 
Sign
Investment-
Grade
Speculative-
Grade
Investment-
Grade
Speculative-
Grade
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Panel B: Advanced and Developing Countries (excluding the U.S. and Japan) 
See Appendix A for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic development level. 
See Appendix B for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent variable is long-term leverage to 
the market value of total assets ratio (MLLEV). m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of 
the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Instruments for 
the transformed equation in all columns are MLLEV(t-2), EBIT/TA(t-2), MTB(t-2), SIZE(t-2), TANG/TA(t-2), 
MEDLEV(t-2), and further lags. Instruments for the levels equation in all columns are ΔMLLEV(t-1), ΔEBIT/TA(t-1), 
ΔMTB(t-1), ΔSIZE(t-1), ΔTANG/TA(t-1), ΔMEDLEV(t-1), and further lags. T-statistics based on asymptotic standard 
errors that are robust to small sample bias, heteroskedasticity, and clustered by the firms are in the parentheses. *, 
**, and *** indicate coefficient significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Year and country 
dummies are included, but not presented. The Investment-Grade (Speculative-Grade) column reports estimated 
coefficients for all firms with S&P’s issuer credit ratings BBB- or above (BB+ or below). 
 
 
LAGLEV + 0.6335*** 0.5151*** 0.6775*** 0.5310***
(11.81) (4.06) (4.96) (3.67)
EBIT/TA - -0.1468 -0.1265 -0.2813 0.2466
(-1.39) (-0.78) (-1.48) (0.63)
MTB - 0.0075 -0.0310** 0.0038 0.0150
(0.78) (-2.31) (0.32) (0.37)
SIZE + 0.0109 0.0428 -0.0161 -0.0061
(0.98) (1.27) (-0.76) (-0.23)
TANG/TA + 0.0427 -0.0308 -0.0348 0.1194
(0.84) (-0.36) (-0.44) (0.87)
MEDLEV + 0.1384* 0.4421*** 0.1009 0.8365***
(1.65) (2.98) (0.83) (3.56)
INFL + -0.0026 0.0085 0.0031* 0.0018
(-1.30) (0.92) (1.72) (1.25)
BOND + -0.0000 0.0006 0.0002 -0.0001
(-0.23) (0.78) (0.22) (-0.07)
FINARCH - 0.0003 0.0105 -0.0064 0.0005
(0.18) (1.32) (-1.12) (0.04)
MBDUM - -0.0028 -0.1098 -0.0637 0.0430
(-0.13) (-1.20) (-0.74) (0.36)
Firms 252 104 27 48
Observations 2,193 520 170 241
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1994-2010 1994-2010
Correlation 1 -7.16*** -3.03*** -2.39** -3.87***
Correlation 2 -1.59 1.12 -0.74 1.93*
Hansen test (p-value) 0.21 0.43 0.97 0.12
Advanced Countries (excl. 
the U.S & Japan)
Developing Countries
Independent 
Variable
Expected 
Sign
Investment-
Grade
Speculative-
Grade
Investment-
Grade
Speculative-
Grade
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Panel C: the U.S. and Japan 
See Appendix B for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent variable is long-term leverage to 
the market value of total assets ratio (MLLEV). m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of 
the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Instruments for 
the transformed equation in all columns are MLLEV(t-2), EBIT/TA(t-2), MTB(t-2), SIZE(t-2), TANG/TA(t-2), 
MEDLEV(t-2), and further lags. Instruments for the levels equation in all columns are ΔMLLEV(t-1), ΔEBIT/TA(t-1), 
ΔMTB(t-1), ΔSIZE(t-1), ΔTANG/TA(t-1), ΔMEDLEV(t-1), and further lags. T-statistics based on asymptotic standard 
errors that are robust to small sample bias, heteroskedasticity, and clustered by the firms are in the parentheses. *, 
**, and *** indicate coefficient significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Year dummies are 
included, but not presented. The Investment-Grade (Speculative-Grade) column reports estimated coefficients 
for all firms with S&P’s issuer credit ratings BBB- or above (BB+ or below). 
 
 
 
 
  
LAGLEV + 0.7285*** 0.6237*** 0.7542*** 0.6479***
(38.40) (20.90) (9.87) (7.39)
EBIT/TA - -0.1510*** -0.2183*** -0.1607 -0.5464
(-5.33) (-4.54) (-1.29) (-1.50)
MTB - -0.0093*** -0.0427*** -0.0022 -0.0305
(-5.78) (-6.98) (-0.13) (-0.40)
SIZE + -0.0004 -0.0030 0.0016 0.0168
(-0.31) (-0.65) (0.30) (0.75)
TANG/TA + 0.0198* 0.0122 -0.0494 -0.0135
(1.91) (0.64) (-0.74) (-0.00)
MEDLEV + 0.1181*** 0.2792*** 0.1199 0.6741*
(3.55) (3.74) (1.12) (1.66)
INFL + 0.0102*** 0.0205*** 0.0167*** 0.0073
(8.69) (7.73) (3.37) (0.26)
BOND + -0.0000 -0.0012* 0.0008 -0.0017
(-0.32) (-1.65) (0.72) (-0.25)
FINARCH - 0.0101*** 0.0140*** 0.0142 -0.0143
(7.10) (3.58) (0.86) (-0.16)
Firms 534 593 207 70
Observations 6,432 4,333 1,246 337
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010
m1(Z-statistic) -12.34*** -7.04*** -5.57*** -2.97***
m2(Z-statistic) 0.66 0.93 1.74* 0.87
Hansen test (p-value) 0.40 0.78 0.27 0.13
the U.S. Japan
Independent 
Variable
Expected 
Sign
Investment-
Grade
Speculative-
Grade
Investment-
Grade
Speculative-
Grade
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Figure 1: Yearly plot of Median FINARCH Values for Samples of Firms 
 
Figure 2: Average Values of Long-Term Leverage to the Market Value of Total Assets Ratio 
(MLLEV) by Different Credit Ratings 
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Appendix A 
Sample Countries Grouped by Financial Systems’ Orientation and Economic Development 
This appendix presents all the countries used in the study with regards to their level of economic development, 
according to the International Monetary Fund’s classification. There are 5 economies considered as developing 
and 14 as advanced. Moreover, there are 8 economies with a financial system classified as bank-based and 11 
countries that are market-based. Values in round brackets correspond to the number of firms and observations in 
the given country, respectively. 
 
 
 
Source: Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002), IMF (2012), and Popov (1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Market-Based Bank-Based Advanced Developing
Australia (27; 323) France (40; 394) Australia (27; 323) India (8; 53)
Canada (55; 551) Germany (35; 327) Canada (55; 551) Indonesia (13; 86)
Hong Kong (11; 86) India (8; 53) France (40; 394) Mexico (16; 170)
Korea (19; 144) Indonesia (13; 86) Germany (35; 327) Russia (18; 111)
Mexico (16; 170) Italy (16; 132) Hong Kong (11; 86) Thailand (7; 55)
the Netherlands (13; 133) Japan (240; 1,823) Italy (16; 132)
Sweden (16; 186) Russia (18; 111) Japan (240; 1,823)
Switzerland (13; 129) Spain (10; 109) Korea (19; 144)
Thailand (7; 55) the Netherlands (13; 133)
the U.K. (53; 505) Spain (10; 109)
the U.S. (904; 11,729) Sweden (16; 186)
Switzerland (13; 129)
the U.K. (53; 505)
the U.S. (904; 11,729)
Country Financial System’s Orientation Country’s Economic Development
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Appendix B 
Firm, Industry, and Country Characteristics 
This appendix lists all dependent and independent variables used in the regression analysis. The Name column 
quotes the exact names of dependent (MLLEV, MLEV, BLLEV, and BLEV) and independent variables used in the 
econometric modeling process, corresponding to the mentioned characteristics. The Definition column describes 
calculations performed to obtain the variables. The Data Source / Reference column provides all the databases 
and articles from which we obtain the variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Name Variable Definition Data Source / Reference
Dependent 
variable
MLLEV Long-term leverage to 
the  market value of 
total assets ratio
Long-term debt/(Book Value of Total 
Assets-Book Value of Equity + Market 
Value of Equity)
Compustat 
MLEV Total leverage to the 
market value of total 
assets ratio
(Long-term debt + Short-term debt)/(Book 
Value of Total Assets-Book Value of 
Equity + Market Value of Equity)
Compustat 
BLLEV Long-term leverage to 
the book value of total 
assets ratio
Long-term debt/Book Value of Total assets Compustat 
BLEV Total leverage to the 
book value of total 
assets ratio
(Long-term debt + Short-term debt)/Book 
Value of Total assets
Compustat 
Firm 
characteristics
EBIT/TA Profitability ratio Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Book 
Value of Total assets
Compustat 
(Long-term debt + Short-term
Debt + Preferred capital + Market Value of 
Equity)/Book Value of Total assets
SIZE Firm size Natural logarithm of total annual assets 
measured in the U.S. dollars
Compustat 
TANG/TA Relative tangible assets [Property, Plant and Equipment Total 
(Net)]/Book Value of Total Assets
Compustat
RATINGL1 Standard & Poor’s 
domestic long-term  
issuers credit ratings 
lagged one year as 
compared with all other 
variables
transformed by assigning ordinal values: 
from 1 for the lowest rating (D), to 22 for 
the highest rating (AAA)
Compustat North 
America,                   
OSIRIS,                             
S&P Global Credit Portal
MTB Market-to-book ratio 
(growth opportunities)
Compustat 
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Appendix B continued  
 
 
 
  
Name Variable Definition Data Source / Reference
Industry 
characteristic
MEDLEV Median industry 
leverage
The median value of MLEV  variable by SIC 
code and by year
Compustat,                    
EHSO (2012),                       
de Jong et al. (2008)
Macroeconomic 
variables
INFL  Annual Inflation rate Inflation measured by the consumer price 
index reflects the annual percentage 
change
The World Bank (2011)
BOND Annual Bond Market 
Development
Measured annually such as: (public bond 
market capitalization + private bond market 
capitalization) / GDP
de Jong et al. (2008),            
Čihák et al. (2012)
The first principal component of three 
indices measuring the country’s financial 
system orientation based on the relative 
size, activity, and efficiency of stock 
markets vis-à-vis the banking sector. The 
higher is the value of FINARCH, the more 
market-oriented is the financial system of a 
country.
Čihák et al. (2012), Levine 
(2002), Tadesse (2006)
           The relative size index: [(market 
capitalization of domestic stocks / GDP) / 
deposit money bank assets / GDP)]
Čihák et al. (2012)
           The relative efficiency index: [(total 
value of shares traded /average real market 
capitalization) * (banking overhead costs / 
banking assets)]
Čihák et al. (2012)
           The relative activity index: [(total 
value of shares traded / GDP) / (claims of 
the banking sector against the private real 
sector / GDP)]
Čihák et al. (2012)
MBDUM Market based economy 
dummy
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
economy has the market-based financial 
system and zero otherwise
Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2002),    
Popov (1999)
DEVDUM Developed economy 
dummy
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
economy is considered as advanced and 
zero otherwise
IMF (2012)
FINARCH Financial Architecture 
(measured annually)
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Appendix C 
Expected Relations between a Firm’s Capital Structure and its Determinants 
This appendix presents the observed direction of the impact of firm, industry and macroeconomic determinants 
of capital structure in the previous research from the field if investigation. A plus sign (+) means that in their 
study, authors find evidence for a positive and significant relation between the dependent and independent 
variables. A minus sign (-) equals to a negative and significant relation. The Literature Source column provides 
the number of papers in which the aforementioned relationship was observed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capital Structure 
Determinants
Variable 
Used as a 
Proxy
Expected Sign Literature Source
Lagged leverage   
( first lag of firm's 
gearing ratio)
LAGLEV + Antoniou et al. (2008), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Huang and Ritter (2009),
Korajczyk and Levy (2003), Leary and Roberts (2005), Öztekin and Flannery (2012)
Profitability EBIT/TA - Antoniou et al. (2008), Leary and Roberts (2005), Lemmon et al. (2008), Rajan and
Zingales (1995)
Growth 
opportunities
MTB - Antoniou et al. (2008), Flannery and Rangan (2006), González and González (2008),
Lemmon et al. (2008), Myers (1984)
Firm size SIZE + Antoniou et al. (2008), Flannery and Rangan (2006), González and González (2008),
Lemmon et al. (2008), Öztekin and Flannery (2012)
Relative tangible 
assets
TANG/TA + Antoniou et al. (2008), Flannery and Rangan (2006), González and González (2008),
Lemmon et al. (2008)
- Byoun (2011), Frank and Goyal (2009), Leary and Roberts (2005)
Industry median 
leverage
MEDLEV + Flannery and Rangan (2006), González and González (2008), Lemmon et al. (2008),
Öztekin and Flannery (2012)
Inflation rate INFL + Frank and Goyal (2009)
Bond market BOND + de Jong et al. (2008)
Financial 
architecture
FINARCH - to the best of my knowledge, there has been no prior study documenting such a
relation. However, since the FINARCH variable is an additional and alternative way
to measure market orientation of financial systems, the same sign is expected as for
the MBDUM dummy variable.
- Antoniou et al. (2008), Borio (1990)
Advanced 
economy
DEVDUM + Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), Fan et al. (2012)
Firm-specific characteristics
Market-based 
economy
MBDUM
Firm credit rating 
(first lag)
RATINGL1
Industry-specific characteristics
Macroeconomic variables
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Appendix D 
Ordinal Coding System along with S&P’s Rating Scale 
This table summarizes firms’ issuer letter credit ratings used by S&P (the left-hand column) and the 
corresponding numerical equivalents used in our study (the middle column). The highest possible rating assigned 
(AAA), is reserved for the firms with “Extremely strong capacity to meet financial commitments” and the lowest 
possible rating (D) means “Payment default on financial commitments” S&P (2012). The right-hand column 
presents frequencies and percentages of the overall sample (from 1991 to 2010) for each credit rating category. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: S&P (2012) 
 
 
 
  
Rating
AAA 22 243 (1.43%)
AA+ 21 104 (0.61%)
AA 20 431 (2.53%)
AA- 19 709 (4.16)
A+ 18 905 (5.31%)
A 17 1581 (9.27%)
A- 16 1496 (8.78%)
BBB+ 15 1770 (10.38%)
BBB 14 2102 (12.33%)
BBB- 13 1612 (9.46%)
BB+ 12 1055 (6.19%)
BB 11 1300 (7.63%)
BB- 10 1465 (8.59%)
B+ 9 1108 (6.50%)
B 8 627 (3.68%)
B- 7 318 (1.87%)
CCC+ 6 90 (0.53%)
CCC 5 38 (0.22%)
CCC- 4 12 (0.07%)
CC 3 26 (0.15%)
SD 2 8 (0.05%)
D 1 46 (0.027%)
Ordinal Value Asigned
Standard & Poor's Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating
Frequency in the Sample             
(%  of the Sample)
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Appendix E 
Speeds of Adjustment (SOAs) by Countries (One-Step System GMM) 
This table summarizes the annual percentage SOA estimates for the market leverage ratio (proxied by the 
MLLEV variable) of firms based in each of 19 sample’s countries using One-Step System GMM technique 
separately for all countries except Japan and the U.S., for which the Two-Step System GMM estimates from 
Table 3 are used. See Appendix B for the list of all variables and their definitions. Rows (1) to (19) show 
information on each of the sample’s economies. Mean and median values are presented in the last two rows (20) 
and (21). *, **, and *** indicate estimates’ statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Row Country Firms Observations SOA
(1) Australia 27 295 0.26***
(2) Canada 55 495 0.31***
(3) France 40 366 0.21***
(4) Germany 35 285 0.40***
(5) Hong Kong 10 76 0.14***
(6) India 8 45 0.75
(7) Indonesia 13 73 0.72
(8) Italy 16 116 0.45**
(9) Japan 240 1,583 0.25***
(10) Korea 19 124 0.64
(11) Mexico 16 153 0.31**
(12) the Netherlands 13 127 0.38**
(13) Russia 18 92 0.65
(14) Spain 10 101 0.40***
(15) Sweden 16 172 0.55***
(16) Switzerland 13 116 0.26***
(17) Thailand 7 48 0.30**
(18) the U.K. 53 440 0.45***
(19) the U.S. 904 10,765 0.35***
(20) Mean 80 814 0.41
(21) Median 16 127 0.38
